

تذہیب

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Issue I

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Spring 2024

Interdisciplinary Development Research and Action Center

Habib University
shaping futures

About the Journal

Tezhib (*not tehzib*)-or Illumination literally means to ornament a surface with gold. It is an art form that manifests as palmettes, rosettes, and arabesques around the margins of the Quran and in important manuscripts, illuminating the mind of the reader through knowledge and beauty.

Allegorically, the art of Tezhib is represented by the tree; an attempt to understand the roots of knowledge, which branch from the mind towards the Infinite. The floral forms and motifs rest upon geometric patterns, which travel within a spectrum from finitude to infinitude.

Tezhib Undergraduate Research Journal was founded in 2018 with the vision of making a diverse set of knowledge and intellectual thought more accessible. It is a student led journal by Habib University students, with the support of Habib University's faculty. It serves as a platform for the research produced by students from undergraduate universities across Pakistan in the fields of literature, language, philosophy, development, religious studies, and technology. It aspires to motivate students towards research and to cultivate a culture of inquiry and academic discourse.

Editor's Note

Tezhib is not just a journal: it is a platform for researchers to present their work in unique and interactive ways, such as podcasts, blogs and research working group sessions. In 2023-24, Tezhib hosted 1 book talk with a Habib University faculty member and 3 research working group sessions with Habib University alumni. One such research working group session in collaboration with the Office of Research, had a Dean's Fellow and their student present research on common interests. This is the kind of research culture that Tezhib is proud to cultivate on campus.

Tezhib also contributed to the undergraduate research conference 'Aamozish-e-Tehqiq: Navigating Gender, Climate and Peace building' in March 2024, in collaboration with the Office of Research and the Social Development and Policy program. Special thanks to Dr. Shama Dossa for creating this opportunity and the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) for providing the fund for the conference. Tezhib will be publishing a special edition of the papers submitted on the conference theme at the end of May 2024.

The student, faculty and staff collaboration that Tezhib is able to foster is central to its working. We bore witness to its collaborative success by being selected as panelist for The Engaged Liberal Art in the Global South Conference hosted by the Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Morocco in April 2024.

We are also proud to announce that, as of February 2024, Tezhib is recognized by the Council of Undergraduate Research (CUR). CUR is platform that recognizes institutions that have exemplary undergraduate research programs and faculty who have facilitated undergraduate research at their institutions through their mentorship and leadership. Being an internationally listed undergraduate journal

showcases Tezhib's commitment to excellence and mission.

And lastly, as we sign off our tenure we are proud to publish Tezhib's Volume III. This volume is divided in to two issues. Issue 1 is about Comparative Analysis, Religion and Philosophy while Issue 2 is about Economics, Social Issues, Health and Welfare. We hope that these issues bring to light insights from undergraduate researchers from Pakistan on these topics in order to cultivate a culture of research and inquiry.

Congratulations to all the authors being published!

I would like to take a moment to thank my incredible Managerial Editors, Samana Butul and Soha Zaka and our extremely diligent design lead, Soheba Shoaib for all their hard work, skill and leadership without which none of this would have been possible. And to the entire team including all the designers, social media managers and event leads for working tirelessly throughout the year.

I would also like to especially appreciate the student and faculty reviewers for volunteering their time in reviewing the papers despite their busy schedules in the middle of the semester. Thank you to all of you!

Lastly, we are incredibly in debt to Dr. Coline Ferrant for her unwavering support and trust in Tezhib. Thank you professor for everything that you have done for us!

Saniyah Salman
Editor in Chief
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CONTENTS

Tezhib

Religion and Philosophy

1. Harmonies of Faith: Exploring the Rituals and Significance of Ginans in Ismailli Muslim Tradition **09**
Imra Hemani

2. Analyzing the Role of Religion in Shaping the Politics of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf Post-2013 ..... **18**
Fida Hussain

3. Islam and Politics – The Emergence of Islamism **34**
Hassan Salman

4. Conceiving The Self: A Comparative Exploration of Selfhood in Vasubandhu's Indian Buddhist and Shankaracharya's Hindu Philosophical Traditions **44**
Ali Murtaza

Comparitive Analysis

5. Post-Colonial State-Periphery Relationships in South Asia: Comparing Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan and Jammu & Kashmir in India **53**
Ashmal Amyn Essa

6. Lehenga Uthake Chalo: A Comparative Analysis of Ismat Chughtai's The Homemaker and Saim Sadiq's Joyland **76**
Rahim

7. The Multidimensional Self: A Comparative Analysis of Buddhist and Islamic Hermeneutics of the Self **83**
Syed Muhammad Yousuf

Harmonies of Faith:
Exploring the Rituals and Significance of Ginans in Ismailli Muslim Tradition

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Abstract

Music and religion; two very distinct subjects yet intertwined in many spiritual and historical ways. It is thus important for us to delve into this intersection in order to understand the diverse ways humans have been using, and still use, to connect to their God. This paper gives us an in-depth insight into the Ismailli Muslim tradition of *Ginans*, hymns that are integral to their religious practices and communal identity. It examines the etymology, performance, and contextual significance of *Ginans,* highlighting their role in worship, spiritual upliftment, and knowledge transmission. Through semi-structured interviews with community elders, this research explores specific *Ginans* recited during various occasions, revealing their historical and cultural importance. The study underscores *Ginans* as a unifying force, fostering a sense of belonging and continuity among Ismaillis globally.

The relationship between music and religion is complex yet they are very closely knit. There are several forms of religious practices in numerous beliefs and sects that integrate musical forms and raags in them. One such example is *Ginans* in Ismailli Muslims Community. *Ginans* are known to be a tradition of north Indian music and have majorly two etymologies attached to it. First, it is connected to the Urdu and Hindi word '*gana*' or Arabic word '*ghina*', which is 'to sing' (Gillani, 2012). This etymology helps us understand how signing the hymns is the core of this practice. The second etymology links the word *ginan* to the Sanskrit root *jnana*, which accounts for the words *gnan* or *gyan*, known as the variants of the word *ginan*. This etymology of the word translates to 'supreme knowledge' (Gillani, 2012). This link to the knowledge helps us understand how this tradition is a source of knowledge and historical *daa'wa* (religious mission) for the Ismailli Muslims. The communal practice involves singing these hymns collectively, for the purpose of worship, *zikr*, spiritual upliftment, and transmission of knowledge. These *ginans* aren't accompanied by musical instruments and are recited like *hamds* or *naats*. These hymns were produced and written in several Indian languages like Khojki, Gujarati, Hindi, Punjabi, Saraiki, Sindhi, etc. by Ismailli *Dais* and *Pirs*. However, the interesting aspect here is that there are specific *ginans* that are performed on specific occasions or for particular reasons/situations. Their specificity is majorly dependent on the rhythms, textual context, or the history of the *ginans*. After interviewing several individuals from the Ismailli community, I have noted down several *ginans* that are only recited at particular instances or due to specific reasons. Hence, this paper will discuss various *ginans*, a musical heritage of Ismailli Muslims, and their specific context of performance by the community on distinct occasions. The research in this paper is mainly based on the information I have gathered from the seniors of the Ismailli community using semi-structured interviews.

The oral tradition of reciting *ginan* has been a significant part of Ismailli rituals. This practice of 'collective and cultural memory' is practiced all around the world regardless of wherever the Ismaillis live (Gillani, 2012, p.16). The recitation of *ginans* mainly takes place as a communal practice at the *jamatkhanas* (prayer halls) both in the evening and morning, where the *ginans* are recited after or before dua (daily prayers) collectively. A person or a group of people lead the recitation and everyone follows, the reciter then eventually becomes one with the chorus voice as a result, 'both performance and participation become one' (Gillani, 2012, p.17). This leader can be anyone from the community regardless of their gender, age or position. However, *ginans* are also recited individually or in groups outside *jamatkhanas* as a devotional practice. The diversity of the kind

of *ginans* that exist is exceptional. It ranges from *ginans* devoted to particular occasions or the time of the day, to signifying certain practices and historical events.

'*Asha Ji*', also known as '*Anant Akharo*', was written by Pir Hassan Kabiruddin (14 - 15 CE) and is a *ginan* of immense importance today to the Ismailli community. This *ginan* has 400 parts, and it is particularly designated to be recited before evening prayers daily. One part of *ashaji* is mandatory to begin the evening dua. It is communally recited in chorus at the *jamatkhana* five minutes before the dua begins. This *ginan* carries a lot of historical significance for the community as it was composed by Pir Hassan Kabiruddin at a very young age. Pir Saddardin, the father of Pir Hassan Kabiruddin, denied him the opportunity to attend the *zahiri deedar* of the Imam of the time, due to his young age. As a plea to meet the Imam, Pir Hassan wrote these 400 parts of *ginan* on a piece of cloth and made it into a *pagri*. Pir Saddardin, as a consequence of denying Pir Hassan to accompany him to *dedaar*, faced intense issues and restrictions to meet Imam. Finally, when Pir Hassan was made to meet Imam, he presented him with the *pagri*. The Imam of the time put it on his own head, removed it after a while, and then placed it on Pir Hassan's head. This incident accounted for the parts of *Ashaji* to be a symbol of love, longing and mercy from the Imam. It is thus, till date, considered a *ginan*, full of *giryazari*, that prepares a *murid* for prayers. Reciting it before dua, symbolizes their intention to begin the spiritual conversation with Imam through dua. The *raag* and the overall feel of the *ginan* is also slow and longing. Hence, this *ginan*, due to its historical composition, is particularly designated for communal recitation before evening prayers.

Thursdays, being '*jummah raat*' or '*raat before jummah*' , was considered significant in previous Ismailli communities. Therefore, there are certain *ginans* that are religiously recited on Thursdays every week. Kalam e Maula is one of the *ginans* that hold a huge spiritual significance for Ismaillis. It is recited on every Thursday in the morning, at *jamatkhanas*. Mornings and ibadat during midnight is considered very essential in the Ismailli *tareeqa*, and thus, one day i.e. Thursday is designated for the recital of at least one part of Kalam e Maula every week. This *ginan* is known to be the 'sayings of Hazrat Ali'. The preaching of Hazrat Ali was compiled and was transformed into musical forms by adding *raags*, by *Pirs* in subcontinent. They aren't the literal sayings of Hazrat Ali, but are the compiled form of his teachings in Urdu and Hindi. They are commonly known under the category of '*Roohani Khayal ke ginan*' i.e. *ginans* of spiritual thought.

This is because the topics that it caters to is related to bettering our lives on earth, in order to prepare ourselves for the Day of Judgment. For each part of Kalam e Maula, there are different subjects like generosity, greed etc. This *ginan* is also usually recited on funerals, as a reminder of how short life is and how important it is to live life according to the teachings of Hazrat Ali. Another *ginan* that is dedicatedly recited every Thursday, in evening *jamatkhanas*, between two duas is Chogariya. Chogariya literally translates to 'Chaar Ghariya' i.e. four times. In Subcontinent previously, the day was divided in 8 *ghariya*, and a trumpet was blown after 4 *ghariya* to indicate the announcement of the new kingdom. These songs or blowing of trumpet was known as Chogariya. Religiously, this Chogariya was employed to indicate the spiritual kingdom of Imam. Due to this, there are also mentions of instruments like *dhol, dhamdhama, tambal, nagara* or drums to welcome Imam or celebrate him (Gillani, 2012). All the Chogariyas are written in Sindhi language, and are based on the poetic style of Sindhi *Wai*. The tunes of Chogariya give off very happy and celebratory impressions.

Taliqa, for the Ismailli community, is a special message or *farman* from the Imam. Historically, these Taliqas were received through an extensive process of Imam writing a *khat* and sending it through postal workers to the communities. In the joy of receiving guidance and blessings from Imam, the community used to express their happiness through Taliqa *ginans*. However, today the Taliqas are sent online to the councils, and are presented and read in *jamatkhanas* by the *jamati* leaders. After the Taliqas are read out aloud the *jamat* in chorus recites the Taliqa *ginans*. Two of the major *ginans* in this reference include Sayyed Imam Shah's '*Shaan na khat aaviya*' which translates to 'my lord has send us a message' and Pir Hassan Kabiruddin's '*Saheb farmaan lakhi mokaliya*' which means 'the master has sent the commandments' (Gillani, 2012). These are therefore only recited after Taliqas, as a declaration of cheerfulness, gratefulness and joy to receive Imam's message.

Garbi *ginans* have their etymology from '*garba*' which is a Gujrati folk dance, performed during Navarati that is a festival to honor Gujrat's mother goddesses (Gillani, 2012). *Garba* is also performed on other joyous occasions like weddings, pregnancy announcements, and various religious ceremonies. During the process of Ismailli *daa'wa* in Subcontinent, Pir Shams employed the technique of composing *ginan* according to the rhythms of *garba* and sang them while dancing with the Hindu groups. He did not only compose *garbi ginans* but also performed them with the communities. Thus, the *garbis* are very similar to

Bollywood songs we hear today associated to *garbas*. Gillani (2012) mentions some critical aspects of *garbi ginans* that aid us in tracing their historical and musical resemblance to Gujrati *garbas*. 'All *garbis* are very upbeat, and share the doha (two lines poetic structure) form of poetry. The *garbi ginan* is sung in a metric cycle of *garba taal*, eight beat (four plus four), very popular for *bhajans* and folk songs. The tonal structure of the *ginan* is in *rag bhairvai,* which according to Indian classical music is a morning *rag*'. One of the *garbi ginans* is written as:

Pir nachine kanthe ginanre man,
The Pir dances and recites wisdom (Ginan)!

Em samjavine gur kahe chhe re maan
O Mother, the Guru explains things thus:

Tame samjo te satni sanre ma,
Try and understand the signs of truth (sat)!

Em samjavine gur kahe chhe re ma
O Mother, the Guru explains things thus:

Tame jutha shun kidha acharre ma,
Why have you adopted such false practices! (Gillani, 2012)

This shows the nature of *garbi ginans* and the practice of *pirs* to dance while preaching, in order to grasp the attention of Hindus. Other *garbi ginans* include tare *vagate, goor kadhe che, avi garbi sampurara* etc. These are generally collectively recited in the evening *jamatkhanas* after prayers.

There are three main days, which are celebrated as occasions annually, known as '*Khushalis*'. These three days are very significant for the Ismailli community and therefore, each one of them has a designated ginan known as khushali *ginans*. These *ginans* are only recited on the auspicious days of khushalis when the whole community is gathered for a celebratory *majlis* in *jamatkhanas*. People buy new clothes, females apply *mehendi*/henna on their hands, cakes and sweets are exchanged and there are various other celebrations taking place. The khushali *ginans* play an important role in remembering the practice of *zikr* of Imam and the *pirs* who wrote these *ginans*. The rhythms of these *ginans* are very happy and cheerful. The first khushali of the year is Navroz on 21st March. It is

the new year of the Persian calender. Sayyed Fateh Ali Shah wrote the Navroz *ginan*. The *ginan* is a tribute to the visit of Shah Fateh Ali to Imam Khalillulah (39th Imam) when the Imam was away to hunt in forest, and he couldn't meet him. The Navroz *ginan* is as follows:

Eji navaroz na din sohamannaa

shri hari Qayam shikar ramava gaya sevak na man thaya udasi,

paraan hari charanne raheaa.

On the lovely day of the New Year, the noble ever-living Lord went to the forest to hunt. The heart of his servant was saddened, but his soul remained at His feet. (Gillani, 2012)

The second khushali is Imamat day, which is celebrated on 11th July every year. This is the day when the current 49th Imam, Imam H. H Shah Karim al-Hussaini, became the spiritual leader and took the position of Imam from his ancestor. The *ginan* for this Khushali represents and signifies the ceremony when Imam would have taken his place on the throne of Imamat i.e. *taakhth*. The *ginan* is as follows:

Ya Ali khub majalis zeenat kar-ke

farash bichai gaali aan bethe hae takht ke upar

Shah Sultan mahamad shaha vaali

Aaj raaj mubaarak hove, Nur aen ali ku(n) raaj mubarak hove

Shaha aal-e nabi ku(n) raj mubarak hove,

hove hove aaj raaj mubarak hove

O Ali, in the splendid assembly gloriously adorned, with carpets spread upon the floor, Sultan Muhammad Shah the Lord has ascended the throne. Blessed be your rule today! Blessed be your rule, O light of Ali's eyes! Blessed be your rule, O Lord, descendant of the Prophet! Blessed be your rule today! (Gillani, 2012)

The third khushali of the Ismailli community is on 13th December, which is the *Salgirah Mubarak* of the present Imam. This day is also celebrated with utmost joy and gratefulness. The *ginan* on this Khushali is also based on the theme of thankfulness for this day of Khushali, and a reminder to do good deeds and better ourselves. The *ginan* "*Dhan Dhan Aajno daadlo re*" is as follows:

Eji dhan dhan aajno daadlo re

ame hareevar paayaa

chaar jug naa kasamal paap-j taalleeyaa jee

het no mellaa vddo re aapnnaa satgur su(n) keeje jee

man no mellaav ddo aapnnaa baargur su(n) keeje

dhutaaro sa(n)saar parale - chhoddee mukeeje bhaai

tthagaaro sa(n)saar shaah jine naame tareejiye

enne sa(n)saare bhalaa(n) sukaram kaam keeje.

O momins, it is an auspicious day today (a day of joy full of fortunes), for we have gained the recognition of the Supreme Lord, our Imam, the Protector and Provider. The impurities of the sins of the four ages (Kartaa, Tretaa, Duaapur & Kaljug) have been removed (wiped out). Have a gathering full of love with the True Guide. Have a gathering full of heart's desire with the Master of twelve crore souls Pir Sadardin who assisted and enabled them to achieve salvation in the present age. Keep aside the world which is only but a cheat, O brothers, with the Name of our Mowla cross over the world, which is only, but a thief And do good deeds in this world (Gillani, 2012)

These khushali *ginans* are of utmost significance to the community and are almost memorized by all Ismaillis around the world. They are only recited on these specific dates and are treated with special significance and as a symbol of happiness and gratefulness.

All in all, there are a lot of other types of *ginaans* that make up an integral part of this traditional practice of singing hymns to express themselves, transmit knowledge, and remind oneself of *siraat e mustakim*. The ones afore-mentioned are some of the major kinds of *ginaans* that are performed or recited at a particular occasion to signify something. Few of the other types include *khara ginan, venti, subah saqid ke ginan, granth* etc. The rest of the *ginaans* that do not fall into any specific category are known as *aam ginans* i.e. ordinary *ginaans* and are recited daily, without any particular occasion needed. In my opinion, using rhythms and musical forms to transmit knowledge or preach people is very interesting and beneficial because they are easy to memorize and help people invoke feelings and thoughts while listening to them peacefully, contrary to long religious speeches. Moreover, it also instills a sense of community because of the practice of reciting *ginans* together in choruses every day, and at different happy and sad occasions like khushalis or funerals. It provides one with a feeling of unity and belongingness to the community. In conclusion, *ginans* are an important musical tradition in Ismailli community that holds them together as a community, and connects them with their Imam and their history.

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Analyzing the Role of Religion in Shaping the Politics of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf Post-2013

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Abstract

Political Islam has always been a key factor in Pakistani politics. The basis of independence was laid on the foundations of political Islam to give this idea a new identity. Since independence, it has always played an important role in determining the course of politics for this state. This paper singles out the politics of Pakistan-e-Tehreek Insaaf (PTI) and its leader to study how the entity has used political Islam to shape its political career. The purpose of this research is to analyze the use of religion in the politics of PTI for shaping its narrative. The methodology includes discourse analysis based on secondary research of PTI's manifestoes, speeches, and interviews. The religious aspect of that narrative is then highlighted in the light of a large theoretical framework which is the idea of political Islam. As the analysis suggests PTI heavily satisfies the discourse and perfectly aligns with the research question as its political ideology has been shaped by the use of Islam to mobilize the masses and target their religious sentiments to increase their vote bank.

Introduction

The complex interplay of religion and politics in Pakistan, particularly in the context of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) post-2013, presents a multifaceted narrative. Religion has played an important role in shaping the political arena in the context of Pakistan since independence and even before that. It has always been used by political parties to sell their manifestos to the common people by playing with their emotions using the sensitive notions of religion. The political leaders have always played a blame game of calling each other "Kaafir" and "Yahoodi" while considering themselves the true holders of Khilafah and the Kingdom of God. There are multiple facets to this issue like the involvement of the military, foreign influence and others, but all of these issues had a direct impact on the functioning of religion in the sphere of Pakistan politics. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) ruled by its leader Imran Khan is no different from the other religio-political entities in Pakistan. In this paper, we aim to analyze the politics of PTI post-2013 using the context of Islam, to understand how PTI has built its political narrative using the religion card to mobilize the masses. The paper examines scholarly perspectives on the issue using academic papers and articles from newspapersTop of Form. Analyzing the research question at hand it delves deep into the manifestoes, speeches, interviews, and press releases of PTI and its leader Imran Khan to argue how PTI has built its political structure using Islam as the base for mobilizing masses and shaping Imran Khan as a populist leader.

Literature Review

The foundation of the paper that encapsulates the abstract and thesis question is laid by Dawn's article 'Religion & politics' (Muhammad Rafaay Khan, 2022) which explains the intricate relationship between politics and religion in Pakistan. It outlines the central thesis, which is that political dynamics are significantly influenced by religion.

The use of religion by Khan during his tenure can be described as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, initiatives such as the Ehsaas program, the Sehat card and a global call for the UN to recognize the 15th of March as a day that marks combatting islamophobia can be seen in a positive light. However, the trouble with governance based on popularity values wrapped up in this ideology of an

Islamic state is that one might take one step forward but two steps back. Of course, it's pertinent to delve into the initial stages which saw the party adopt values of religion into their manifesto and revolve around them. As the author 'Nadeem Farooq Paracha' writes in 'Imran Khan: Myth of Pakistani Middle Class,' Khan's demeanor post-2013 election loss depicts a trend of damage control and long-term sustainability. Sustainability is the object to clean-sweep the competition in the next elections. The timing of inheriting this savior complex, for the people's leadership style, was apt considering the tumultuous reign of the PMLN which saw tenures of corruption and deceit. Khan's essence of capitalizing on PMLN's public downfall can be seen as opportunistic; the push for elaborate protests, sit-ins and an objective to unify the public by acting as their voice ties in well with the introduction to religion within him and the politics of his party.

The crux of the matter is that regardless of which side of the sword you find yourself, the fundamentals upon which Khan legitimized his rule remain the same; overseeing the development of Pakistan as an Islamic welfare state. The inclusion of the Ehsaas program, run on Islamic principles, amongst other initiatives pays dividends to his idea of creating this Riyasat-i-Madina of a state. This seemingly extreme approach for an Islamic state isn't helped by the fact that 'Almost 90 per cent of Pakistanis regard religion as very important in their life, while 37pc highly approve of having a system governed by religious law without political parties.' (Khan, 2022). Where Raafay Khan states that 'Allowing faith its rightful place in Pakistan's political discourse is critical for a progressive, democratic, and cohesive society' is perhaps the only way forward for the country. It entails allowing for the natural flow of religion and intersectionality into politics while keeping in mind the overarching possibilities of manipulation and power that can be exploited if faith finds itself in the hands of the wrong actors.

Building on the aforementioned, the Dawn article titled 'PTI Exploiting the Religious Card' by 'Adeel Daniel' explores particular cases in which PTI has cynically exploited religious feelings for political gain and further develops on the push to create a riyasat-i-madina (model of state of Medina). It gives instances from everyday life to show how the party handles the intricate relationship between politics and religion. Whilst one can argue that the claims put forth are valid, one cannot help but notice the convenience in blaming the opposing party and current leadership in power just as Khan and his party were ousted from forms of leadership themselves. It almost feels like an appeal to the public via religion, thus the mention of communities such as Ahmadis as non-muslims to

perhaps get the public to side with Khan.

Outside the hot seat, it seems that Khan and his party can play the religion card in a seemingly carefree manner. The war of work between contesting parties depicts the common phenomenon that Pakistan faces; the use of religion to manipulate public opinion. So, it seems that one figurehead slip of the tongue can be another party's political gain. This can be seen through the tussle between the PMLN party and PTI, and by using the word shirk to describe the supposedly fluid loyalty of lawyers of the country or the reiteration of Ahmadis not being Muslim. The article ties in well with research by 'Dr. Muhammad Javeed Akhtar, M. Tahir Ashra' titled 'Political Islam and Populism in Pakistan's Politics: A study Of Pakistan Tahreek-I-Insaf's Leadership' which essentially portrays how Khan connects with the religious sentiments of the Pakistani nation and appears as an immaculate Muslim. Centering Islam in his governance paradigm remained the primary focus of Khan's politics along with his campaign to eradicate corruption and hold the people who were at the helm of affairs in the past. Holding people accountable and using that as the premise for your political agenda can be seen concerning the religious card that is carelessly tossed around in times when the party is winning or when it is on the back burner.

The synthesis between the foundation of religion in politics to the introduction of PTI as this harbinger of Islam in the form of Imran Khan ties well and gains historical context from The Diplomat's article, which charts the development of PTI's use of religion in politics. As is also depicted by authors 'Benford and Snow's annual review titled 'Framing Process and Social Movements,' in terms of religious orientation the PTI ideology reflects a 'modernist' outlook that inclines 'Islamic liberalism', a standpoint that is not reflected elsewhere in the political spectrum in Pakistan. Its Centrist political ideology distinguishes it from other mainstream parties with its 'ability to withstand pressures from right-wing groups as well as the liberals and remain consistently committed to its principles which also harks back to the idea of appealing to the middle-class and public via capitalizing on the shortcomings of PMLN and other opposing parties. It gives context for how the PTI's strategy has changed over time and aids in understanding how the party planned to handle religious dynamics. Such dynamics are not only reiterated through the mention of the concept of riyasat e madina being validated, but it also adds examples on the external factors influencing the islamisation of politics i.e the clerics. Imran Khan's stance on the creation of such an islamic state gave fuel to the self-interest of local clerics which carried out extremist actions and

hardline bans on remotely sensitive subjects all in the name of establishing Imran Khan and PTI's dream.

Inconsistent dynamics from PTI themselves led by the idea of isalmisation have been a cause of contention as well as has been previously pointed out. The academic analysis termed 'Party Profile Series on PTI' written by 'Ihsan Yilmaz & Kainat Shakil' highlights the synergy between PTI and Imran Khan working at once to capture the political space through religion. Not only has this been seen in the aforementioned sources during the discussion on religion and politics, it signifies that the sole purpose of the Riyasat-e-Madinah is to serve the public by eliminating corruption and returning money to the people, which, of course, appealed to the public. Using this rhetoric in a country where belief in miracles is common and education is a rare commodity was a genius move by PTI. The promise of Riyasat-e-Madinah resonated with people of all ideologues, liberals, moderates, and conservatives, with each interpreting the vague promise through their perspectives. PTI coupled the Islamic rhetoric with anti-establishment rhetoric, which helped it gain more popularity amongst the masses. The anti-establishment rhetoric was aimed at delegitimizing other parties, leaving PTI as the sole legitimized party for voters. PTI's success in the 2018 election is attributed to the Islamic and Anti-establishment rhetoric it used as the party appealed to the emotions of the public and passed around a populist message.

The inconsistency portrayed in the previous sources trickles down into an article by the Friday Times 'Imran Khan's Rhetoric and the Politics of Jihad' by 'Umer Farooq' which in a way extends upon what was previously discussed regarding the power that clerics hold during Islamisation but now applied to the party itself, most notably on the excessive use 'Jihad' as a means of furthering a cause of self-interest or playing on peoples religious emotions to rally the nation. 'Jihad' is an ideology. You either stick by it or not. Like Insafians, if you stick by it, then you are helping Imran Khan in establishing Riyasat-e-madinah and vanishing corruption from Pakistan in 90 days. If you don't stick by it, then you are just against Islam and support evil in society. The black-and-white approach that was present in Imran Khan's governance naturally attracted a fair amount of backlash, but the majority were happy with discriminating the believers from the disbelievers or kafirs. An ideal recipe for impending civil war one would argue. The use of the word 'jihad' for your political movement became even more worrisome when Khan used it to describe his political protest in Peshawar, a province still grappling with the aftermath of religiously-inspired insurgency. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has

experienced the use of 'jihad' by both the state and militant groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The overlap in terminology poses risks, as it blurs the lines between state operations and militant propaganda, leading to potential confusion and desertions among troops. The Dawn article titled 'PTI Exploiting the Religious Card' could be linked with this due to the visible presence of PTI's reaction if it is cornered and that is to label an actor or organisation as kafirs or not believing in riyasat-e-madinah. A war of words in which religion is the main facilitator for who gets painted as good and bad.

Adding onto that, the source 'Imran Khan: Defender of Islam or Political Opportunist?' by 'Ellis Heasley' considers critically whether Imran Khan's acts are consistent with his stated support for Islam. It provides a critical lens to the synthesis and adds a nuanced perspective by raising doubts about the sincerity of PTI's leadership in preserving Islamic principles. For instance, as mentioned, On November 15th, 2019, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony rejected a bill, which would have criminalized forced conversions of underage non-Muslim girls in Pakistan. This came as a response to Khan's promise that "no new law would be enacted under his rule if it was deemed to be "in direct conflict with the teachings of Islam" (Heasley, 2021). Khan's constant cozying up to the Council of Islamic Ideology made him go against his word and accept the rejection of the bill, whereas, he deemed the forced conversion of non-muslim girls as an un-Islamic practice. PTI has only strengthened the religious groups of Pakistan by giving them authority and by using religion to suppress its political opponents or to rally the support of people by playing on their emotions. The emphasis of political rhetoric and jargon to seize control of the state using Islamization of policies or captivating the people's minds using religious rhetoric has proved to be the common denominator in all the sources depicting PTI's inception to Imran Khan's charismatic take as a leader with an idea to impose an identity on a nation that's always struggled with identity in the first place.

Methodology

The methodology for conducting this study relies on the targeted discourse analysis of PTI's speeches, interviews, and manifestoes post-2013. These documents and archives were selected as the secondary source of research as they represent the official narrative of PTI and its leadership on their religio-political position.

The analysis of speeches and manifestos begins with the process of locating and annotating references to religious speech. The party's religious discourse is then categorized into different themes which are extracted using a thematic analysis, to provide a more developed understanding of the party's messaging highlighting the religious discourse.

Different themes of analysis are then connected to the larger theoretical framework of political Islam and are then analyzed by looking at the understanding of political Islam and its role in shaping political narratives.

PTI's Manifestos: A Religious Analysis

The manifestos of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) tell a complex story that tries to combine the religious rhetoric along with the political goals to effectively speak to the strongly held beliefs of the country's Muslim majority. PTI, which began its journey as a Movement for Justice, explains its vision for Pakistan through its 2013 manifesto in a powerful way within the framework of justice and equity that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) established in Medina. The manifesto clearly states that "The Movement for Justice/Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), was envisaged as a Movement to fight for a just and equitable society based on the system that Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) laid down in the Medina Charter" (PTI Manifesto, 2018).

The manifesto uses strategic use of Islamic vocabulary and historical highlights to explain its political ideology from the very first page of the manifesto. This narrative helps the PTI to express their political ideology within the historical framework of the first welfare state in Islamic history, Medina. The manifesto also highlights the party's dedication to the establishment of an "Islamic Welfare State," reiterating Jinnah and Allama Iqbal's words. As the manifesto mentions its goal of, "A Pakistan built on Iqbal's dream and Jinnah's vision – encapsulated in an Islamic Welfare State" (PTI manifesto, 2013).

Furthermore, PTI explains its ideology of justice as a cornerstone of its Islamic teachings, which is emphasized by referencing Ibn-e-Khaldun's quote regarding the correlation between how Muslim civilizations faced a downfall when they stopped being just. The manifesto explains this prophecy as, "Unfortunately, as the

Muslim philosopher Ibn-e-Khaldun predicted: when the Muslims' commitment to justice declined so did their civilization" (PTI manifesto, 2018).

Furthermore, the manifesto skillfully incorporates jargon like "Islamic Welfare State " and "Prophet Mohammad's system" for presenting their Islamic touch narrative using effective rhetoric. This intentional usage of Islamic jargon aims to sensitize the voters' feelings and emotions for their religion. The manifesto reads, "A Naya Pakistan that will place the life and dignity of all its citizens above all else " (PTI manifesto, 2013).

Speeches and Interviews: Religious Rhetoric

Imran Khan, the party leader has left no stone unturned in skillfully blending the religious rhetoric in all of his political speeches and interviews, creating a mutually beneficial relationship between the Islamic values and PTI's policies. We will start analysis of PTI's policies within the government and even without that by starting with one of the biggest examples of this dedication, which was the formation of "Rehmat-ul-lil-Alamin" Authority during the "Ashra-e-Rehmat-ul-Lil-Aalamin" conference in Islamabad (Dawn, 2021). Imran Khan was the country's prime minister during that time and thus he used his authority to express his faith in religion. Khan in his inauguration speech stressed the importance of this authority in studying and teaching the lessons from the life of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). He said that this authority will focus on children and adults, and is ideally positioned to blend religious instructions into societal frameworks (Dawn, 2021). Furthermore, monitoring school curricula to ensure that the biography of the Holy Prophet is taught effectively was also part of the authority's mandate. This multifaceted approach shows the PTI's deliberate effort to infuse religious values into education, highlighting it as a broader narrative of promoting an Islamic ethos.

During his government, Prime Minister Khan repeatedly described Pakistan as an enduring bastion of Islam on the international scene. Declarations such as "Pakistan will always remain a fortress of Islam" (Radio Pakistan, 2022), which contains his motion on defending the rights and interests of all Muslim Ummah worldwide, present a commitment to portray the nation as a global defender of Islamic ideals. On one more occasion, this time in 2012 Khan described

the Taliban's fight against foreign occupation in Afghanistan as "jihad" (The Guardian, 2012). demonstrating the remarkable junction of religious and political narratives. His framing of rhetoric in all instances is consistent with his larger narrative of being the protector of Islam and Muslims, especially in light of the American war in Afghanistan. The portrayal of the Taliban's actions as a legitimate struggle for freedom represents Khan's belief in the righteousness of armed resistance in the name of Islam just as his political strategy is.

Moreover, Prime Minister Imran Khan deliberately positioned his government to align with the nation's conservative Islamic components since taking office in 2018. He demonstrated his support for the conservative elements by showing his tight relations with organizations like the Council of Islamic Ideology. This council declares itself as a "constitutional body that advises the legislature whether or not a certain law is repugnant to Islam," (Heasley, 2021). This council acts as a body that has a substantial say in how Pakistani legislation is shaped. Khan on numerous instances has shown particularly strong relations with such conservative factions, demonstrating a conscious attempt to match his party policy choices with Islamic values. In a meeting with Islamic scholars in Karachi, Prime Minister Khan reiterated his commitment to establishing a government based on Islamic principles before the elections of 2023. He stressed that no new law would be in place under his rule if it was in some way to be "in direct conflict with the teachings of Islam (Heasley, 2021).

Khan also uses the "Islamic touch" in his political campaigns by promoting them as "jihad." He often uses phrases like "Namoos-e-Risalat movement" (honor of prophethood) in PTI's campaign to establish Khan as a global leader and the pivotal point in the fight against Islamophobia by relating his party policies to the notion of being the savior of Muslim ummah. Imran Khan uses complex Islamic vocabulary to address delicate global concerns during legislative debates. He sets the precedent for the Pakistani nation that he is a world leader when it comes to representing Islam and fighting against islamophobia on the international forums and due to his efforts Pakistan will always remain a fortress of Islam, and a defender of the rights and interests of Muslims around the world (Khan, 2022). He goes to the extent that he once called Osama bin Laden "Shaheed" or martyr (BBC, 2020), to express how he represents all types of Muslims who stood against the West and their policies.

If we connect all the dots, we can observe that the recurring theme in Khan's

talks is his narrative of creating an Islamic welfare state modelled after Medina, which he clearly stated at the International Rehmat-ul-lil-Alameen Conference. He reiterates multiple times and on various occasions his vow of presenting the Prophet Muhammad's (PBUH) vision as a blueprint for the creation of an Islamic society. These speeches show how Imran Khan has made no doubt a conscious effort to blend religious rhetoric into his political discourse to make his government's policies seem consistent with Islamic values.

Linking to Larger Political Islam Project

To understand the religious rhetoric used by Pakistan-e-Tehreek Insaaf like most of the other political parties in the political arena of Pakistani politics and to analyze our discourse with its conceptual framework, we need to understand what political Islam is. According to an explanation provided by Muhmmad Ayoob in his research article, "Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and implemented in some fashion" (Ayoob, 2004). To explain the political action carried out in the name of Islam, however, this generalization does not go very far. Political scientist Guilian Denoeux offers a more analytically helpful term, characterizing Islamism as a "form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today's societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition." (Deneoux, 2002). Analyzing this explanation of political Islam, we can reach the conclusion in simpler words that it is an abuse of religion to attain the political motives of different organizations by targeting the religious sentiments of masses and making politics a matter of faith, belief, and trust in God.

In the context of Pakistan, political Islam was always a tactic used by dictators to justify their unconstitutional governments. Hussain Haqqani in his book, Pakistan between mosque and military draws this interesting connection where he explains how it has always been the political parties backed by the military who have used the tactics of political Islam for attracting the voter bank. Haqani analyzes each military dictator era, along with the periods where the military had indirectly supported religio-political groups in shaping their political ideologies (Haqqani, 2005). However, after the Musharaffe period, as the military is no

longer involved in direct rule, the notion of political Islam is being used with such a precision and in undercovers that it would have never been predicted before, and PTI is a living example of that.

In his research article written in 2004, Robert G. Wirsing had very different opinions about political Islam against what we think of it as today. Agreeing to Haqani's thesis, Wirsing also blames military rule for actively using political Islam in the context of Pakistani politics. However, he believed that "political Islam appears to be far less powerful than often argued. It has achieved a solid and permanent mass following in no society, certainly not in Pakistan, but neither in Iran or even Afghanistan. In the case of Pakistan, political Islam has clearly flourished most in periods of direct military rule; conversely, it has performed most dismally in periods of democratic rule (Wirsing, 2004). However, what Wrising failed to predict is that we are living in an era, where the military is no longer a direct stakeholder in Pakistani politics. Nowadays it prefers to have a backend in controlling the picture. Post 2013, PTI became the military backed group in Pakistani politics and again this joint informal association relied on the same old political Islam tactics to build an image in Pakistani politics.

This time, PTI was not a purely religious political organization, like the ones backed by the military in the past. Its leader was an ex-cricketer who claimed himself to be a hedonist on live television (Economic Times, 2023) but still, he turned himself into a pious man in front of the camera and a forebear of Islamic teachings to justify his political practices in the name of Islam. The above research suggests how skillfully Khan employed religious discourse in his speeches and interviews. From the founding of the Rehmat-ul-lil-Aalameen Authority to his dedication to upholding Islam internationally, Khan skillfully uses Islamic terminology to support his political narrative. The framing of political campaigns as "jihad," support for the Taliban, and alliance with sections of hardline Islam. These were some of the practices that Khan deployed for shaping his political career using religion as the baseline.

Examining Khan's involvement with conservative Islamic elements during the government reveals the connection to the conceptual framework of political Islam. Khan intentionally positions himself to appeal to conservative emotions by associating with organizations such as the Council of Islamic Ideology and emphasizing that no legislation would be passed if it was thought to be in opposition to Islamic teachings. Khan's support for the decision and rejection of

a bill that would have made forced conversions illegal highlight his preference for political pragmatism over enacting changes that would be seen as going against traditional conservative beliefs.

When taken as a whole, these incidents paint a picture that suggests Imran Khan uses political Islam as a weapon for political advantage rather than because he has a strong ideological adherence to Islamic beliefs. A leader skilled in using religious feelings to gain political support is depicted by the manifestos' scant focus on specific Islamic rules and policies as well as their judicious use of Islamic rhetoric in speeches, interviews, and official decisions. This interpretation is in line with the theoretical framework of political Islam, which holds that religious symbolism and language may be used to further political goals. In this case, this is how Imran Khan's political narrative is supported by the various demographic groups.

Critique and Challenges

Even though Imran Khan's interaction with political Islam has been thoroughly examined in this research paper, there are still certain issues and criticisms that must be addressed. Given that the majority of the primary materials for analysis are PTI manifestos and speeches by Imran Khan, it is important to take into account the possibility of bias in source selection. Because these sources are political by nature, relying on them could introduce some subjectivity and strategic framing. Furthermore, the absence of concrete policy details in the manifestos makes it difficult to accurately define how the PTI's proposed Islamic legislation will be implemented. Discourse analysis's interpretive character also makes it susceptible to biases in the recognition and classification of religious themes.

Furthermore, while PTI's public discourse is the main focus of the research, other readings of the party's Islamic stance or internal dynamics may merit additional investigation. Furthermore, Imran Khan's strategy for political Islam may change in the future because of the dynamic nature of politics; this study just represents a particular point in time. These criticisms highlight the intricate and varied aspects of political Islam, which calls for a careful reading of the research paper's conclusions.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the research showed how PTI politics has been shaped by the narrative of political Islam, employed by the party leadership to attract the masses. A comprehensive analysis of the party's manifestos, press releases, Imran Khan's speeches, and interviews helped us to draw the connection where the party has deliberately used religious tactics and policy matters to shape such a narrative. Furthermore, a detailed look at PTI's manifesto suggested that religious policy-making is not something at the core of its practices. Its manifesto barely mentions religion apart from its introduction and basic Pakistani ideology thesis. As analyzed through the theoretical framework of political Islam, this study suggests that religion has no more application in PTI's politics apart from portraying Khan as a wise pious man and his government is a reflection of Medina from the times of prophet Muhammad (PBUH). This similar narrative is widely visible in Khan's speeches and it all comes to the point where Khan starts claiming to be the forebearer of Namoos-e-Risalat (honor of prophethood) on the global stage, thus taking the position of a Khalifah for the modern-day ummah.

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Annexure A

A compilation video of Imran Khan's Speeches about Islam and implementation of Islamic values in Pakistan https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x8faaf9

Prime Minister Imran Khan's Special Interview with Hamza Ali Abbasi on Hum News | 05th Dec 2020 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A2gFbFH0IdA

Qasim Suri Advices Imran Khan to give "an Islamic Touch" to his speech during a

political gathering https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ivjQ8mOTu8c

Syed Muzammil talks about political Islam and use of religion in politics all around the world in his youtube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OvOiSQ8oB68

A bibliometric analysis of literature on political Islam https://dergipark.org.tr/en download/article-file/2315392

ChatGpt was also utilized, following prompts were run for the research:

1. Explain political Islam with reference to Pakistani Politics
2. Relate PTI's politics to political Islam and Pakistan
3. Analyze the following analysis of PTI in light of political Islam

Islam and Politics – the emergence of Islamism

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Abstract

As Political Islam takes up a major chunk of political discourse within the Western world, it is important to look at the history of Islamism and how it emerged. The emergence of 'political Islam' as a concept is deeply linked with the history of colonialism with the intertwining of modern concept of nation-states and theological concepts of leadership within Islam. This paper utilizes historical analysis of the emergence of Islamism in the Middle East during the First World War to examine the historicity of political Islam and its connection to the emergence of a modern sectarian cold war between the Sunni Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Shia Islamic Republic of Iran.

Introduction

Islam has been a part of political rhetoric in the Middle East since the middle eastern states started gaining independence from colonialism. The first time this happened was when Sharif Husayn, who was made the King of Hejaz by the British after the First World War, claimed to be the Caliph; which meant that he claimed to be the political representative for all Muslims. This was a bizarre claim as Sharif Husayn's own government was formed after helping the British by leading the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Sultan who was recognized as the Caliph worldwide. Sharif Husayn's kingdom was itself toppled by Ibn Saud who was influenced by the reformist Wahabi movement. Since then, Saudi Arabia has played an important role in influencing Middle Eastern politics especially when it comes to the specific Wahabi brand of Political Islam. Political Islam has also taken space within Shia Islam especially after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran. Since then, Iran and Saudi Arabia have also been engaged in a cold war through various proxy wars in the region. This paper will explore the rise of Wahabism in Saudi Arabia and its impact in the development of Islamism across the whole region. Moreover, will also analyze the role of political Islam in the nation-building process of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and beyond. The main focus of this analysis will be post World War II and how the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia and Iran helped in furthering Political Islam beyond the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran into the Greater Middle East through their rivalry in the proxy wars across the region.

The Rise of Saudi Arabia:

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia solidified its control over a major chunk of the Arabian Peninsula during the interwar period. As the control of Sharif Husayn – the king of Hejaz – loosened up, the king of Nejd i.e., Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rehman Al-Saud solidified his control over the area and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia came into being. It is important to note that while the rest of the middle east was busy in creating modern nation-states during the interwar period, Saudi Arabia solidified itself as an absolute monarchy. Saudi Arabia was able to do this with the help of the Wahhabi movement. The House of Saud and the Wahhabis had an agreement which allowed the Aal al-Shaykh i.e., the Wahhabi Ulema to take care of religious affairs within the Saudi state, whereas in return, the Ulema would grant the House of Saud legitimacy to rule. This happened when Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabi movement was

"adopted and protected by the amir of Dir'iyya, Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud, in 1744. This resulted in the renowned agreement between the two ambitious men, one a tribal chief and the other a religious reformer" (Salame, 1987, p.310).

Hence, when Saudi Arabia became a unified kingdom, it started propagating itself as the core of the Islamic world. They declared that "the Saudi constitution is the Quran, and the shari'a is the source of its laws. Even the Basic Law of Government {al-nizam al-asasi li'l hukm), issued in 1992, stressed their supremacy" (Nevo, 1998, p.35). Through these measures, Saudi Arabia linked its existence and nationalist thought with Islam; specifically, the Wahhabi brand of Islam. Life in Saudi Arabia was totally linked to Wahhabism, this was because "The Wahhabis were given full control of the religious, social and cultural life of the kingdom. As long as the Wahhabi preachers preached that Saudis should obey their rulers, the al-Saud family were happy" (Is Saudi Arabia to blame for Islamic State? 2015). The link between Saudi nationalism and a sense of being the core of Islam was also bolstered by the fact that the holiest cities in Islam – Makkah and Medina – were in the kingdom, and the king had adopted the title "Custodian of the two holy cities" as well.

After the Second World War and discovery of oil within Saudi Arabia, the kingdom became extremely rich. This caused Saudi Arabia to heavily invest in exporting Wahhabism globally in order to maintain its hegemony over the Islamic world. "In recent decades, the Saudis have spent up to an estimated $100 billion spreading Wahhabism and perpetuating the notion that they are Islam's caretaker" (Pandith, 2019). This shows that Saudi Arabia has been propagating Wahhabism throughout the Islamic world in order to maintain its hegemony by undermining other sects and movements within other countries. This has become a special problem within countries where Shia and Sunni populations live together as after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran, Iran has also been doing the same. This has caused many proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran in different countries, which will be discussed in the paper later on.

Making of an Islamic Republic:

After the First World War, Iran emerged as a secular monarchy. The Shah of Iran – Reza Shah – had completely taken over all the state institutions, and started ruling as an autocrat; however, "he was also a reformer committed to strengthening

Iran through forced measures of Westernization and centralization" (Cleveland & Bunton, 2018, p.187). These measures were strict enough that women were penalized for wearing the Hijab. The conservative population of Iran did not agree with the intensity of these reforms; which can be seen in the repeated protests against the mandatory hijab; for which "twenty-nine women [had] been arrested for taking off their head scarves, according to the government" until 2018" (Wright, 2018). The reforms were so strict that the Ulema were replaced as judges by secular bureaucracy and "the shariah and the shariah judicial system … were bypassed through new legislation and confined to increasingly narrow fields of jurisdiction—specifically, to matters of family law" (Cleveland & Bunton, 2018, p.187). This trend continued after the Second World War, when Reza Shah Pahlavi continued the secular reforms with great intensity. However, these reforms started getting a much greater backlash from the Ulema, who started advocating against the monarch. It was during this time that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was exiled first to Iraq and later to France.

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran was a turning point for Shia Islam. Although it was "a mass movement of diverse interests and political groups within Iranian society [which had] come together to overthrow the Shah" (Olsen, 2019), the movement was overtaken by religious narratives since they were much more popular among the people because of the aggressive religious reforms. However, the movement was very progressive in nature when Ali Shariati was the at the helm of it. "Ali Shariati's thought has been described as "a radical…democratic and progressive version of Islam" (Keddie, 1982:290). Despite the inherently Islamic nature of Shariati's philosophy, he argued against "not only monarchs and kings but also the Iranian ulema possessing and exercising power over the people" (Paşaoğlu, 2013:112). Thus, Shariati was a politically active Muslim yet not an Islamist" (Olsen, 2019). This means that while the revolution did use Islamic imagery and narratives, the goal was to establish freedom of religion for the population rather than establishing a theocratic state with Ulema as the rulers.

This changed when Khomeini became a the most popular leader in the revolution, the narrative shifted towards a much more Islamic perspective. Khomeini normalized the narrative in which the Ulema "wanted to bring down the Pahlavi empire and replace it with a theocracy (velayat-e-faqih) in which the supreme power would be held by a faqih, or cleric, specializing in Islamic law" (Kepel, 2002). When the revolution happened, Khomeini used the concept of Velayat-

e-Faqih to establish a theocratic "Islamic Republic" in Iran of which he became the Supreme Leader. As the Supreme Leader, Khomeini held an office which was above every institution and he had veto power over everything. This means that effectively, Khomeini had replaced the Shah himself. Through the Vilayet-e-Faqih, the face of Shia Islam was also changed as it became a tool for nation building within Iran.

After the revolution, Shia Islam became a much more active force in the politics of the middle east. Before the revolution, during the reign of the Safavids, Shia Islam was not used as an active tool in politics as much as Sunni Islam. This is because the Shah had claimed to be the representative of the twelfth Imam during his occultation, which left all political power in the hands of the Shah, whereas the Ulema only had a say in religious matters. After the revolution, this actively changed as "Khomeini called for the people of Iran to "endure hardships and pressures" to allow the country's officials to "carry out their main obligation, which is to spread Islam across the world"" (Ansari & Aarabi, 2019). This means that Khomeini utilized Shia Islam to "export" the revolution and create groups within the rest of the middle east that would serve the Islamic Republic's interests; while justifying them as supporting the cause of Islam.

A Cold War:

Since the revolution in Iran, many Shia groups emerged in different parts of the Middle East. This challenged Saudi Arabia as before the revolution, it was the only country in the region that had weaponized political Islam within the region. Hence, seeing Iran as a threat, the Saudis began to "not only to accelerate their efforts to spread Wahhabism through their global infrastructure but also to debunk Khomeini's vision of Islam by underscoring its Shia identity" (Ansari & Aarabi, 2019). This renewed tensions between Sunni and Shia Islam as they both were being exploited for geopolitical gains by rival countries; which caused proxy wars and militant groups in many middle eastern countries to fight for Saudi Arabia and Iran in the name of their brand of political Islam.

The most important instant of Iran's policy of exporting the revolution was seen in Lebanon. Right after the Iranian Revolution, Israel had invaded Lebanon in 1982. That is when Iran started unifying the Shia youth of Lebanon under Hezbollah. "Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem recalls how

training camps supervised by the IRGC were set up in the Bekaa Valley as early as 1982 and how all members were required to attend these camps and learn how to confront the "enemy."" (Levitt, 2021, p.5). Although the enemy here was Israel, it was a problem for Saudi Arabia as a unified Shia force in Lebanon directly under supervision of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps would be a threat to Saudi Arabia's hegemony within the Levant. Saudi Arabia even went as far as declaring "Hezbollah a terrorist organization earlier [in 2016] and then persuaded their Gulf Cooperation Council allies to do the same" (Riedel, 2016). This means that despite Hezbollah's enemy in Lebanon being Israel, Saudi Arabia still considers it a formidable threat against Saudi hegemony; especially because Hezbollah's narrative is also against the Saudi government. This means that by declaring Hezbollah a terrorist outfit, the Gulf and other Arab countries have sided with the Saudis; who claim to represent all of "Sunnis". Recently, the Prime Minister of Lebanon Saad Hariri resigned from his position in 2017 while on a tour to Saudi Arabia and was being suspected "of being held against his will in the Saudi capital, Riyadh" whereas, "Hassan Nasrallah, head of Lebanon's Shia movement and Iran ally, Hezbollah, said the resignation was "forced"" (Newton, 2017). This shows how the Saudi-Iran geopolitical divide can be used to exploit the Shia Sunni tensions as well; which is what happened and is happening in the Levant.

The Case of Syria:

Syria is a majority Sunni state, where the President belongs to the minority Alawite region; who is supported by Iran. The Saudi government has wanted Assad's reign to end for a long time in order to secure a Saudi friendly government in the Sunni majority state. This project picked up speed when "the Syrian civil war began in March 2011, after the tumult of the Arab Spring protests that unseated autocratic leaders throughout the region and attempted to topple Syrian President Bashar al-Assad" (Newton, 2017). In order to make sure that the regime change happens, Saudi Arabia funded many Sunni, especially Wahhabi groups in Syria to conduct an armed struggle in the region. Although Saudi Arabia openly maintains support for the Syrian Interim Government, which is the rebel Syrian opposition group, it has also been accused of covertly supporting many Islamist militant groups within the region, such as the Al-Nusra Front and the Jaysh al-Islam, who have ideological ties with the Wahhabi movement and have links with Alqaeda. This is a huge problem for the West because Saudi Arabia supplied these groups "with finances and weaponry, including US-made anti-

tank missiles, as part of the effort" (Ayton, 2021).

This means that while Iran is using proxy groups to 'export' the revolution and create homogenous, unified Shia militias, Saudi Arabia is using Western funding and US support to create counter insurgencies and Islamist militias which might become a threat to the West later on. This was seen in the case of Alqaeda which emerged as a Saudi funded group against the USSR in Afghanistan; later became an enemy of the US and the Saudi government as well. Its offshoot in Iraq later became the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) which claimed that the Saudi government has gone 'astray' from the original message of the Wahhabi movement. The 'Caliph' of ISIS Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi said "that the Kingdom "Is trying to secularize its inhabitants and ultimately destroy Islam." He then urged the citizens of Saudi Arabia to overthrow their government" (ISIS Leader Threatens Saudi Arabia In Latest Speech 2018). Similarly, the Proxy Wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran has ruined many countries in the region, such as Yemen. In Yemen, the Houthi rebels – who are a Zaydi Shia group – have been in a state of war against the Sunni-majority government since 2014. This sectarian intra-country conflict has taken the shape of a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran; the former of which supports the central government while the latter is supporting the Houthis.

Yemen: Rebellion or Coup?

The situation in Yemen is almost the opposite to that of Syria. Here, the majority of the population is Sunni and the current Saudi supported government is also headed by Sunnis. The conflict began in Yemen when "Houthi Rebels, a religious group affiliated with the Zaydi sect of Shia Islam, along with forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, took control of large parts of the country in 2014" (Newton, 2017) and forced the Saudi-backed President to flee the country. Since then, Saudi Arabia and its allies have come in support of the government and have conducted air strikes against the Houthi rebels and sent forces as well because the Saudis feared that under a Houthi government, Yemen would become a satellite state for Iran which would place Iran right on the border of Saudi Arabia.

Although Saudi Arabia has been bombing the rebels and has instated a blockade against Yemen. The Houthis still have maintained control of most of the country

including Sanaa, the capital; whereas "the war has killed more than 10,000 people and left over seven million in danger of starvation" (Newton, 2017). This means that had the civil war stayed a civil war and the foreign powers did not get in involved through blockades and air strikes, millions of people in Yemen could have survived.

The conflict has also escalated due to the intervention of Iran, as the Houthis have maintained most of the control on Yemen through covert support from Iran. It is also escalating heavily as "the Houthis took credit for a ballistic missile fired at the Saudi capital of Riyadh on November 5, telling Al Jazeera the "capital cities of countries that continually shell us, targeting innocent civilians, will not be spared from our missiles"" (Newton, 2017). This shows how the war has not stayed a geopolitical proxy war within the borders of Yemen but has blown into an international war with attacks being conducted within each other's territory. After the Riyadh attacks, "the Saudis claimed the missile was supplied by Iran, saying it constituted a declaration of war" (Newton, 2017). This shows how the conflict was never about supporting the elected government or fulfilling the wishes of the Yemeni people. Rather, it was a geopolitical proxy war between Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi/Sunni brand of political Islam and Iran's Shia brand of political Islam, through which both of these countries want to become the regional super power within the middle east.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, it is evident that the rise of Political Islam as an ideology is directly linked with the emergence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a Wahabi petrostate which used Islam as a way to create proxies in the Middle East to solidify its role as the super power within the region. It is also linked with the way that the Islamic Republic of Iran emerged after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, in which the Iranian state started creating Shia groups within several middle eastern countries, through which a cold war in the name of "Shia Islamism" and "Sunni Islamism" began between Saudi Arabia and Iran which affected the lives of common people in countries like Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Due to the emergence of Islamism, the cold war has not stayed between Saudi Arabia and Iran, rather new players like Turkey have also emerged.

Recently, Turkey has started portraying its Ottoman past as a glorious age of Islam

and has started meddling into the conflict going on in Syria and Libya. Moves such as reconverting the Hagia Sophia into a mosque after 80 years can also be seen as reclaiming Turkey's "caliphate" through which it held religious power all of the Sunni Muslim world. These neo-ottoman ambitions of Turkey are threat to both Saudi Arabia as it heads the Sunni world, and a threat to Iran's proxies in the middle east as well. It is also noteworthy that the emergence of Political Islam has not remained within the Middle East but also affected Central Asia and South Asia. In Pakistan for example, many militant Islamist groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan have taken a radical Wahabi approach against the state who wish to create an Islamic state within Pakistan, whereas Iranian proxies like the Zainabiyoun Brigade have been accused of training Pakistani Shias for militant activities within the middle east. This shows how the emergence of Political Islam has completely changed the nature of the religion and has reduced it to a tool for geopolitical proxy wars.

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تذهیب

Conceiving The Self: A Comparative Exploration of Selfhood in Vasubandhu's Indian Buddhist and Shankaracharya's Hindu Philosophical Traditions

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Abstract

This research investigates the contrasting conceptions of selfhood as found in two notable non-modern philosophical traditions: Adi Shankaracharya's Vedanta school and Vasubandhu's Buddhist school. Through employing a comparative analysis of the two traditions through their respective texts, Shankaracharya's A Thousand Teachings and Vasubandhu's Refutation of the Theory of a Self. Vasubandhu's model of selfhood claimed and invoked Buddha's ideas of aggregates and the volatile nature of human existence, with a special emphasis on ultimate existence and liberation. On the other hand, Shankaracharya posits ideas of the eternal and true self (Atman), where Brahman is an all-encompassing reality that becomes the source of everything that exists in reality. While both traditions shared similar perspectives regarding the question of liberation and aspects of the nature of ultimate reality, these two models of selfhood take divergent paths in their understanding of what constitutes a self. This study contributes to the modern discourse about selfhood, discussed by figures such as Charles Taylor, and tries to propose an original form in thinking about the self, distinct from the modern sensibility the word possesses, it focuses on the detaching nature of non-modern selfhood.

Despite an individual's eagerness to quench their desire for apprehension, the barrier of absurdity occasionally overcomes the possibility of perception and, ultimately, recognition of experience. The notion of such a peculiar occurrence is perhaps conventional of modernity, which is not a mere historical category but additionally a phenomenological category that tends to alter the precise manner in which we are experiencing experience itself1. Therefore, with the introduction of modernity's developments, ranging from the emergence of the economy to the unfolding of a racial world order, the category of 'the modern' relates to itself in a historical manner, underscoring its temporal distinctness and thus implying a spatial distinctness, which could refer to the literal alteration in the ecological landscape of the Earth. Furthermore, the other implication hints at the inhabitants of this distinct 'time-space' complex, that detaches itself from the past through its reimagination, propelling the inhabitants of such a space to 're-conceive' themselves, thus the modern self. However, considering the epistemic hegemony the West relishes, the modern self is nonetheless a Western self, where the reimagined individual is best understood considering the developments of the Enlightenment. In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, one finds a rather illuminating exploration of how modern selfhood is organized:

Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters.2

In Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of modernity, a crucial change aimed at installing man as the 'center of the universe' is observed in the backdrop of the Enlightenment, which one can interpret as man's ascentd in the Great Chain of Being3, subsequently bestowing him with the powers to dominate nature. Therefore, the notion of selfhood in modernity is one of assertion, inwardness, and self-determination, as emphasized by thinkers like Charles Taylor4, where an individual has more 'agency' at their disposal, in contrast to non-modern5 people.

However, upon considering the numerous crises, varying in form, economic, ecological, and ultimately existential, the modern conception of selfhood, for lack of a better word, does not help. With a depression epidemic looming large upon us6, climate disruption forming a major portion of our regular physical experience, and inflation altering our primary access to necessities, one must come to terms with the urgency of a much-needed reorientation, not merely of political, social, and economic systems, but rather of interpreting the self, perhaps in an 'original'7 manner. For this paper, I will be comparing and contrasting conceptions of the

self from two non-modern traditions: Vasubandhu's contribution to the Indian Buddhist conception of self and Adi Shankaracharya's conception of self as studied in the Advaita tradition. The immediate aim of the paper, is directed at trying to understand the conceptions of the self in more nuanced forms, adding to its contemporary discourse.

Vasubandhu stands as one of the most influential Buddhist philosophers, who emerged around the fourth or fifth century in Purusapura (modern-day Peshawar) with his Indian treatise reinforcing the Buddhist Anatta (no-self) doctrine. However, to preface the many intellectual disputes he had with other Buddhist schools, such as the Pudgalavadins (the Personalists)8, it is essential to first understand the foundational tenets of Buddhist philosophy as introduced by Gautama, later known as the Buddha (the Enlightened One). Among the innumerable teachings that Buddha imparted, perhaps the most essential to his doctrine remain the Four Noble Truths. These truths, as emphasized by him, underlined the precise nature of human experience and, more significantly, the cause of such an experience. The doctrine consisted of the truth of suffering (dukka), the origin of suffering (samudaya), the cessation of suffering (nirodha), and the path to the cessation of suffering (magga). Therefore, what Buddha had initiated was a philosophical understanding of human life as a phenomenon one must overcome rather than attach itself to through practices such as self-grasping (atmangraha), to achieve liberation from suffering. Hence, the schools that furthered his discourse built on this argument of human suffering (dukka) and subsequently about one's existence or notions of selfhood in the Buddhist context. Vasubandhu's formulation regarding the existence of persons presents the self as a collection of aggregates (skandha-s), as originally iterated by Buddha, consisting of form (rupa), feeling (vedana), discrimination (samjna), volitional forces (samskara-s), and consciousness (vijnana). The aggregates present the human being in the Buddhist tradition, since in their view, it is precisely the collection of these aggregates that truly constitute our experience. However, since Vasubandhu claims direct perception and inference are two substantial modes of knowing reality, the existence of an independent self cannot be perceived nor inferred through the aforementioned collection of aggregates. Considering what one incessantly refers to, are the aggregates and nothing beyond, the argument for selfhood is therefore rendered futile9.

In his debate with the Pudgalavadins, Vasubandhu argues:

"If we are to understand this obscure statement (of why a person is neither substantially real nor real by way of a conception), its meaning must be disclosed. What is meant by (saying that a person is conceived) "in reliance upon (aggregates)"? If it means (that a person is conceived) "on the condition that aggregates have been perceived," then the conception (of a person) refers only to them, (not to an independently existent person,) just as when visible forms and other such things (that comprise milk) have been perceived, the conception of milk refers only to them, (not to an independently existent milk)."10

Thus, more specifically, the existence of each aggregate affirms the existence of the aggregate itself only, which is impermanent11 and conditioned, rejecting the notion of a separate and permanent self. Nor does each aggregate itself constitute the self, which the Buddha categorically declared 'he' was not by withdrawing the 'I' from each respective aggregate. To expound upon the notion of self in question, one might consider the instance of an LED TV playing a classic such as Gentlemen Prefer Blondes (1953)12. Despite an individual's claim to watching 'Marilyn Monroe' on screen, no such person is truly on display, considering each pixel on screen is lit by a combination of the RGB color model13. It is rather the flux of three colors that persists, which further creates the illusion of Marilyn Monroe before the viewer. Thus, the Buddhist conception of the self is one of no-self (anatta), where the recognition of selfhood is a mere illusory experience, one that stems out of confusion and leads to the prolongation of suffering in the empirical world.

Nonetheless, for Vasubandhu, persons do ultimately exist, since we affirm the existence of their mind-body complex; however, persons are not independent of this phenomenal complex, nor are they distinct from it; this subsequently defies the belief held by the Pudgalavadins, who make the case for an individual's existence independent of mental and physical phenomena. The question of ultimate existence, therefore, must be analyzed against the backdrop of Buddha's doctrine of the Two Truths14, which suggests the existence of two realities, namely, conventional reality (samvrti-satya) and ultimate reality (pramartha-satya). In this formulation of realities, the ultimate reality is universal emptiness (sunyata), and it is realized as the true form of the phenomenal world we inherit and is consequently unconditioned in contrast with our conventional experience. Vasubandhu makes the case for a person's ultimate existence only to the extent of the mind-body complex, in opposition yet again to the Pudgalavadin perspective of a separate ultimate existence.15 Furthermore, Buddhist thinkers like Candakriti,

who inhabit the same milieu as Vasubandhu, claim that nothing ultimately exists, and it is essentially this intimation of ultimate existence that enables a major portion of our empirical suffering.

In the 8th century, almost three centuries apart from Vasubandhu, Adi Shankaracharya emerged as a notable Vedic figure in the region of Kerala for expounding upon the doctrine of 'Advaita Vedanta' (non-dualism). Forming a major school in the Hindu philosophical tradition, Adi Shankaracharya used inspiration from the Vedas and Upanishads, both of which he considered valid sources of knowledge, to form the famous Advaita tradition of philosophy. At the heart of Shankaracharya's philosophy lies the notion of Brahman. With its Sanskrit root of 'b-r-h' meaning 'to grow, expand', Brahman refers to absolute reality, one that encompasses all of the phenomenal and meta-phenomenal worlds and is henceforth present in all of existence, further hinting at the idea of oneness, where nothing truly exists outside Brahman.

In Shankaracharya's conception of the self, or 'Atman', an imperative feature that requires comprehension is the notion of non-dualism. Since the existence of Brahman encompasses all of existence, the self, which is perceived as 'pure consciousness', also becomes an inseparable part of it, rejecting the idea of an empirically separate self and emphasizing the self as an immaterial notion requiring recognition. This relates back to a non-dualist idea, since Atman (true self) is perceived as part of Brahman and not as a disparate existence, shedding emphasis on oneness rather than the dual existence of an individual and the Absolute. An instance of the non-dualist notion can also be found in the Chandogya Upanishads, which refer to the phrase 'tat tvam asi' meaning 'thou art that' or 'you are that'16 signaling at the unity of the Atman and Brahman as a single reality. Furthermore, Adi Shankaracharya oriented his tradition in a manner where knowledge, more specifically 'self-knowledge' (Atmabodha), takes precedence over everything else, since the question of one's liberation is supposed to be answered through the acquisition of self-knowledge rather than the performance of rituals. Subsequently, another critical part of the Advaita discourse is the idea of ignorance, which, according to Shankaracharya, is the major hinderance corrupting an individual's exposure to reality17, and in this case, the absolute reality, or Brahman.

In his teachings, Shankaracharya claims:

"On the other hand, liberation results from the acceptance of (the reality of) non-difference is borne out by thousands of Srutis18; for example, after teaching that the individual Self is not different from the supreme One in the text, "'That is the Self, thou art That', and after saying. A man who has a teacher knows Brahman' the Srutis prove liberation to be the result of the knowledge of (the reality of) non-difference only, by saying 'A' knower of Brahman has to wait only so long as he is not merged in Brahman'. That transmigratory existence comes to an absolute cessation."19

Hence, recognition of the self requires an individual to follow a certain trajectory, starting with the renunciation of material possessions, the acquisition of virtuous practice, and aspects of discipline as prescribed by the master. The process of recognizing oneself therefore requires one to become a disciple and cultivate the required values to allow themselves the experience of recognition. Consequently, one has to identify life as a transmigratory experience, where the self has to become one with Brahman to liberate itself from the illusion and suffering of the experiential world.

In the Indic intellectual tradition henceforth, what one finds are diverse, nuanced, and multi-layered conceptions of self, which subsequently possess numerous epistemic similarities and, in some cases, inspirations. Considering the recurring resemblances Buddha's doctrines have with ideas from the Early Upanishads, such as the belief in moksha (liberation), one can convincingly think of the two traditions being intimately related, thereupon sharing similarities on several levels. Firstly, both traditions recognize life as an experience with innumerable illusory qualities that create a false sense of selfhood, leading to the prolongation of empirical suffering. While Buddha attributes attachment as the root of human suffering, Adi Shankaracharya stresses the veil of ignorance as the source of human adversity since it prevents one from recognizing Atman (true self) and ultimately Brahman. Furthermore, the two traditions also regard life as a transitory experience where one must overcome rather than indulge in the human experience, to free themselves from cycles of suffering, when examined against conceptions of reincarnation and rebirth.

In terms of how conceptions of reality are dealt with, Vasubandhu and Adi Shankaracharya tend to have similar approaches. If Buddha's conception of the Two Truths is considered, the existence of the void (sunyata), as he refers to it, is a conception reminiscent of the Advaita tradition's emphasis on Brahman.

Sunyata, the Sanskrit term for void, is described as follows:

"Sunyata, in Buddhist philosophy, the voidness that constitutes ultimate reality; sunyata is seen not as a negation of existence but rather as the undifferentiation out of which all apparent entities, distinctions, and dualities arise."20

Considering the description of sunyata, or void, in Buddhist philosophy, an instantly apparent similarity with Advaitic conception of Brahman is found. Thus, one could regard these two conceptions as highly similar in their essence, except for the manner of conception. David Loy makes an argument for the aforementioned similarity; however, he also expounds upon the manner of conception to point at an underlying difference:

"Why does Vedanta prefer to speak of the One and Buddhism of emptiness?"

"Perhaps the answer to this lies in the nature of philosophy itself. In referring to Brahman as the One without a second, Sankara tries to describe reality from outside, as it were, because that is the only perspective from which it can be described as One...but the view of the Buddha is that we cannot get outside reality and experience it as an object; our efforts as well as our viewpoints are inevitably contained within that whole."21

Therefore, between Shankaracharya and Buddha, the understanding of an ultimate reality is shared; however, the latter does not advocate for a self; therefore, an immersion in or becoming one with an ultimate reality, or Brahman, is non-existent. Furthermore, both philosophical traditions also centralize the matter of liberation and emphasize upon the stakes that it truly holds. Liberation, in Buddhism, might translate to 'nirvana', while in Shankaracharya's context, it hints at the notion of 'moksha' or liberation; nevertheless, both possibilities underline the imperative of realizing the material world's illusion (maya) and seem to appear similar in nature. Loy makes another compelling argument in this domain, bringing together not just two conceptions of liberation of the self, but also proposing that Buddha's anatta, or 'no-self', might equate itself with 'everything is self', postulating the idea of anatta also being encompassed by Brahman.22

The most prominent gulf between the two philosophical traditions, however,

remains their distinct approaches to constructing a self. For Adi Shankaracharya, the self exists, and is self-revelatory in nature, always potentially providing the opportunity for recognition and ultimately merging with Brahman. Henceforth, the existence of the self is substantial and prevalent in the Advaita tradition. On the other hand, the Buddhist approach to understanding the self, especially Vasubandhu, does not go beyond the boundaries of the five aggregates, rejecting any notions of self and limiting the empirical and ultimate existence of an individual as far as the aggregates go.

In a broader context, the philosophical traditions brought forward by Vasubandhu and Adi Shankaracharya stand more alike than different, which does not bewilder one considering the shared geography of numerous thinkers from each tradition, but with certain philosophical distinctions made, often with dissimilar assumptions about matters of selfhood. Further, the conceptions of self discussed in this paper remain antithetical to numerous modern conceptions of the self, the most evident feature of which is the action of withdrawal from the empirical world in the non-modern notions of self, opposed to the indulgent and narcissistic self that further cements and affirms its own existence in this world. Thus, this paper presents an alternative view of how the human conception differed in its comprehension in pre-modernity, opening horizons for more diverse manners of understanding oneself.

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Post-Colonial State-Periphery Relationships in South Asia: Comparing Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan and Jammu & Kashmir in India

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Abstract

In the aftermath of the 1948 Indo-Pakistan War, the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir (with its vassals under the Gilgit Agency) was divided between the countries after a ceasefire was agreed upon. Today, India controls the two union territories of Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh, while Pakistan controls the nominally sovereign state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and the "self-governing" territory of Gilgit-Baltistan. This paper looks at Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan, and Jammu and Kashmir in India, both of which have unique demographics and statuses in their respective states, all the while also having contentious and quite often volatile relationships with them. The paper looks at the background of how this situation came to be, by first tracing the history of the region from the conquest of the greater region by the Sikh Empire to the division of the region in the 1948 Indo-Pakistan War, and then looking at the respective histories of the two territories within and with their administering states, and looks at actions taken by both sides: the ruled territory, and the ruling state. It then looks at actions taken by both the ruling powers – which wish to assimilate and integrate the territories with them according to their narrative – and by the locals of the territories – which wish to either assert or preserve their autonomy, self-governance, and unique identities.

Introduction

The geopolitical region of Jammu and Kashmir sits at the crossroads of Central and South Asia. A largely mountainous region, it comprises of multiple subregions rooted in historic, political, and ethno-religious contexts. The region was largely amalgamated under the suzerainty of the Dogra dynasty that ruled as the Maharajas of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, from 1846 to 1947. In 1948, following the Indo-Pakistani War, Jammu and Kashmir was partitioned between Pakistan and India. Later on, China also gained control of the region, through the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1963 Sino-Pakistan Agreement. Today, Indian controls the union territories of Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh; Pakistan controls the nominally sovereign state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and the "self-governing" territory of Gilgit-Baltistan; and China controls the Trans-Karakoram Tract, Aksai Chin, and part of the Demchok sector. The region is ruled through multiple modes of governance. This paper will look particularly at the political regions of Gilgit-Baltistan and Jammu and Kashmir, which are administered by Pakistan and India respectively. Both of these regions have been highlighted because of their unique demographics and statuses within their respective states, and the volatile relationships they have with the administering states. The paper will seek to understand how both states have sought to incorporate these regions, the consequences of these programmes, and how the states have reacted to them.

Kashmir before the Partition of India

Kashmir until the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar: From Sovereignty to Annexation

The term Kashmir was originally used to refer to the Vale of Kashmir and its surroundings. Since ancient times, the central city of Srinagar has been its centre of learning, politics, economy, and society (Khan 1978). Kashmir had often asserted its independence, seldom coming under foreign control. For most of its history, it was ruled by local Hindu dynasties, and in 1339, the first Muslim dynasty was established in Kashmir, under the Shah Mir dynasty. It subsequently passed into Mughal control in 1586, and then into Durrani control in

1751. While some of the Durrani governors were law-abiding and tolerant, most were not. Durrani governors were reported to cause Shia-Sunni riots and cruelly treat Kashmiri Pandits. They would also impose heavy taxes on the population and

spend heavily on aristocratic luxuries, instead of on agriculture or infrastructure (R. Mir 2011). Thus, the Kashmiris would have welcomed a change in 1819, when the Sikh Empire, under Maharaja Ranjit Singh, took over Kashmir. Under the Sikhs, the Kashmir Valley became an important source of revenue for the Sikh Empire but was still considered a separate region of its own. Around this time, Gulab Singh, a young general in Ranjit Singh's army was anointed the Raja of Jammu in 1822. Gulab Singh and his brothers from the Dogra clan – including Raja Dhyan Singh, who served as Ranjit Singh's wazir (prime minister) for over twenty-five years – helped with the expansion of the Sikh Empire, guiding both its administration and its military (Grewal 2008). Beginning in 1834, led by the general Zorawar Singh Kahluria who was employed by Gulab Singh, the Sikh Empire expanded into Ladakh, Baltistan, and even attempted to conquer Western Tibet (Datta 1997). The Gilgit region also came under the control of the Sikh Empire in 1840, when the Sikh Governor of Kashmir sent troops to protect Gilgit from invading forces from Yasin, thus establishing Gilgit as a Sikh protectorate (Ahmad 2020).

After Raja Dhyan Singh's death, he was succeeded by his son as wazir, and then by Raja Gulab Singh. Around the same time, Maharaja Ranjit Singh had died, and the Sikh Empire began to unravel due to internal dispute. Around the same time, the East India Company, which bordered the Sikh Empire, began a military buildup along the frontiers, and conquered Sindh, located to the south of the Sikh Empire. In response to the British military buildup, the Sikh Army crossed the border – the Sutlej River – causing the British to declare war, thus beginning the First Anglo-Sikh War, which lasted from December 1845 to March 1846. Over the course of the war, the two leading generals of the Sikh Empire, Raja Lal Singh and Tej Singh, both of whom were Sikh Dogras, turned on the army. Raja Lal Singh was also the wazir, as Gulab Singh had left the position earlier, thus removing himself from the conflict (Smith 2019). The war resulted in a huge British victory, who were then able to dictate the terms of surrender to the Sikh Empire in the 1846 Treaty of Lahore, wherein the Sikh Empire was required to pay an indemnity of 15 million rupees. To pay off their debts, the Sikhs had to cede the territories of Kashmir, Hazara, and all other upland territory between the Beas and the Indus to the victors. The Treaty of Lahore also recognized Raja Gulab Singh as an independent sovereign, ruling over Jammu. This was in recognition of his services when he served as an intermediary between the British and Sikh armies, helping them reach agreement on the Treaty of Lahore (Sökefeld 2015). The Treaty of Lahore also allowed the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar, which was

signed between Gulab Singh and the British, wherein "the British government transfers and makes for ever in independent possession to Maharajah Gulab Singh and the heirs male of his body all the hilly or mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the eastward of the River Indus and the westward of the River Ravi including Chamba and excluding Lahol, being part of the territories ceded to the British Government by the Lahore State [Sikh Empire] according to the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty of Lahore, dated 9 March 1846". Gulab Singh was ceded this territory for the price of 7.5 million rupees, subsequent to which Gulab Singh became the ruler of Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh, and Baltistan, establishing the princely State of Jammu and Kashmir (Ahmad 2020). Gilgit, as explained above, had become a protectorate of the Sikh Governor of Kashmir, thus making Gilgit now a protectorate of the Dogras, since the Sikh Army garrison at Gilgit had now given its allegiance to the Dogras. Thus, the Dogras had been established in Jammu and Kashmir, and controlled a large territory that was now colloquially called Kashmir, expanding the term's definition from the Vale to a large part of the far north of the Indian Subcontinent (Ahmad 2020).

Kashmir under the Dogras: The Evolution of Control in India's Northern Frontier

After gaining control over Jammu and Kashmir, the Dogras organized their territory into separate forms of administration. There were two provinces, Jammu and Kashmir; three jagirs (a type of feudal land grant), Bhaderwah, Chenani, and Poonch; and two wazarats (understood as frontier districts in this case), Ladakh and Gilgit (Karim 2013). The Gilgit Wazarat in particular was long thought of as one of the most isolated regions of the subcontinent, and one that was as far away from the politics of India as possible, and thus extremely marginal. However, the British understood the geopolitical importance of Gilgit. The region was surrounded by independent principalities such as Hunza and Nagar which had connections to Central Asia, China, and Russia, the last of which was considered a major rival of Britain in international geopolitics. Thus, the British, sensing the urgency to do so, established the Gilgit Agency, wherein the civil administration of the Gilgit tehsil was taken over by the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and the military affairs were taken over by the British. The surrounding principalities, especially Hunza and Nagar, were thus accessible (Ahmad 2020). These two states paid tribute to the Chinese governor at Xinjiang, recognizing the Chinese Emperor as nominal suzerain, but were fiercely independent in practice, with Hunza raiding all caravans passing through its territory, even

Chinese ones. Their strong independence and inaccessibility meant that during the Great Game, Hunza and Nagar would play an important role in deciding who controls the mountains. The Gilgit Agency, set up in 1889, established trade and diplomatic relations with Hunza and Nagar, along with other states such as Punial and Chitral (Anderson 2005). Under British supervision, Jammu and Kashmir state forces tried to subjugate both states, but repeatedly failed, until both states decided to accept Dogra suzerainty in 1868 (Nagar) and 1869 (Hunza), also thus agreeing to give up raiding. They reneged two decades later, in a response to the construction of a road being built from Gilgit to Chalt, which would threaten their inaccessibility and thus their independence. This led to the 1891 Hunza-Nagar Campaign, whereby the British subdued the two states, forcing them to accept the Dogra Maharaja as their suzerain. Thus Hunza and Nagar were placated, and eventually, the other surrounding regions were also brought under British control (Ahmad 2020).

The British now began to gain a much stronger foothold in the region, largely due to the Communist Revolution in Russia and its subsequent victory in the Russian Civil War, which established the Union of the Soviet Social Republics (USSR) a more serious rival of the British than its predecessor, the Russian Empire (Ahmad 2020). Thus, in 1935, the British leased the Gilgit tehsil from the Maharaja for a period of sixty years, establishing direct British control of the region, without any Dogra intermediaries. The Gilgit Agency thus comprised of the Gilgit tehsil of the Gilgit wazarat (the other tehsil, Astore, remained under Dogra control), the Punial jagir, the states of Hunza and Nagar, the 'governorships' of Ishkoman, Yasin, and Kuh-Ghizer, the proto-republics in Chilas, and the independent valleys of Darel and Tangir (Ahmad 2020). It should be noted here that except for the Gilgit tehsil, all the other entities were considered to be in an anomalous situation. The Kashmir Times is quoted as having said, "We admit that Hunza and Nagar are not included in the lease. According to our information these two states pay tribute to four governments – British, Chinese, Russian and Kashmir and situated as they are deriving benefit from all of them." The newspaper was reprimanded by the government of Jammu and Kashmir for this comment, as they had regularly tried to make Hunza and Nagar a part of their own federal arrangement, only to be rebuked by the British officers. In a decision made in May 1940, and relayed to the Kashmiri government in June 1941, where Colonel Fraser informed the Dogra government that Hunza and Nagar, despite being under the suzerainty of Kashmir, were separate states and not a part of Kashmir; similarly, Chilas, Ghizer, Ishkoman, and Yasin, despite being under the suzerainty of Kashmir, were separate tribal areas and not a part

of Kashmir (Bangash 2010). This becomes an important element during the Partition of 1947, and the subsequent war.

In the meanwhile, the British also set out to gain more effective control, by employing locals in a militia that was called the Gilgit Scouts, which was raised in 1913. The purpose of this militia was to reduce reliance on the Dogra forces, and to employ locals and thus ensure their loyalty to the British rather than to local rulers or to the Dogras (N. Ali 2019). The Gilgit Scouts were thus an entirely local force, albeit they were commanded by British officers and supervised by the British agent in Gilgit. Moreover, this decision to establish the Gilgit Agency under direct British control meant that the states under it were effectively independent of Jammu and Kashmir now, and directly answerable only to the British political agent, who was in turn now answerable only to the central government at Delhi, instead of the British resident at Srinagar as was the case previously. In the meanwhile, Baltistan was still under direct Dogra rule, as part of the Ladakh wazarat. Conditions under the rule of the Dogras were quite oppressive in Baltistan, leading to a migration pattern emerging, wherein Baltis would move out to other regions of Northern India (Ahmad 2020).

In 1947, the Gilgit Agency came into political discourse once again, when the British decided to terminate their lease of the Agency. On 30 July 1947, Major-General Scott, the British commander-in-chief of the army of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, came to Gilgit, to hand over the agency to Brigadier Ghansara Singh, who was to assume the position of Governor of Gilgit. On 1 August 1947, the Gilgit Agency reverted to complete Dogra control. This abrupt decision created confusion amongst the locals, especially amongst the Gilgit Scouts, who feared that the state army of Jammu and Kashmir would take over military duties in the Agency and would disband the Scouts (Bangash 2010). The Gilgit Scouts, under Subedar Major Babar Khan presented a list of demands to Ghansara Singh, asking him to elevate the status of the Gilgit Scouts to the same as that of the state army (Ahmad 2020). A similar confusion also happened in the states under the Gilgit Agency, especially in Hunza and Nagar, which were essentially princely states in their own right. The mirs of both states paid visits to Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir, to discuss the future of their states, especially in the light of the fact that the princely states had to decide which country they wished to accede to. Mir Mohammad Jamal Khan, ruler of Hunza, returned and reported to Major William Brown, leader of the Gilgit Scouts, that the Maharaja had acknowledged that the treaty wherein Hunza and Nagar were made vassal states of Jammu and Kashmir was null and void, due to the fact that

one of the contracting parties – the British – had withdrawn. The Maharaja had proposed a new treaty, but the mirs refused to make any such arrangement, preferring to be independent (Bangash 2010). Amidst this state of confusion, Pakistan and India were granted independence on 14 August and 15 August 1947 respectively, throwing the Gilgit Agency into a far worse state of turmoil.

Partition and the 1947-48 Indo-Kashmir War: The Complex Dynamics of Jammu & Kashmir's Integration into India and Pakistan

Pakistan and India achieved independence respectively on 14 and 15 August 1947. Almost all of the princely states of the former British India acceded to either state in largely peaceful transitions. Certain exceptions include Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kalat. The State of Jammu and Kashmir and its vassals (Hunza, Nagar, Punial, etc.) faced a similar situation (Bangash 2016).

In October 1947, a pogrom was carried out in the Jammu Province. Extremist Hindus and Sikhs started massacring Muslims living in the region and were reportedly led by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and supported by the state army of Jammu and Kashmir (Snedden 2001). In response, the Poonch Rebellion, which had already commenced in July 1947, gained momentum. Local Muslims, supported by Pashtun militiamen from the North-West Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), revolted against the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The rebels declared their intent to join Pakistan and established the provisional government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. After many requests, they were able to convince the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, to support them. Pakistan began to provide the Azad government with arms, ex-servicemen, and more militiamen, allowing the Azad Kashmiris to mount a successful invasion of Kashmir. These pressures led to Maharaja Hari Singh acceding to India on 26 October 1947, in order to gain support of the Indian Army, which promptly entered Kashmir, and airlifted troops and equipment to Srinagar. The Indian Army began to push back into the areas captured by the militias, eventually forcing the Pakistan Army to enter the war officially (Korbel 1966).

While Kashmir was the main hub of this fighting, unrest began to grow in Gilgit too. The locals knew that the Maharaja would accede to India, and while Hunza, Nagar and the other states were possibly independent, the Gilgit wazarat wasn't, and would possibly have to accede, whether the surrounding regions did or not. The locals, almost entirely Muslim, except for a few Hindu and Sikh

tradesmen, overwhelmingly wanted to accede to Pakistan. Major Brown, leader of the Gilgit Scouts, understood that if the region was forced to accede to India, it would erupt in violence. Major Brown and other British officers, understanding the risk, decided to act in a way that would neutralize the Kashmiri administration and help the locals accede to Pakistan. At the same time, the native officers of the Gilgit Scouts, led by Captain Mirza Hassan and Subedar Major Babar Khan also decided to do the same. Moreover, the Mehtar of Chitral also sent a telegram to Major Brown, informing him that Chitral was breaking off relations with Jammu and Kashmir, and would accede to Pakistan, along with Gilgit, thus displaying possible intent to invade and liberate Gilgit (Bangash 2010). Thus on the night of 30 October and 1 November, under Major Brown, Captain Hassan, and Subedar Major Babar Khan, the Gilgit Scouts executed a coup d'état, arresting Ghansara Singh, raising the Pakistani flag, and establishing an Aburi Hukoomat (provisional government) presided over by a relative of the Raja of Gilgit, Shah Rais Khan. While the military had not originally intended to accede to Pakistan, instead preferring to set up an independent state, they found out Major Brown had already asked for assistance from Pakistan, because of which they hesitantly accepted the situation at hand, and acceded to Pakistan (Ahmad 2020). After Gilgit, Hunza and Nagar acceded to Pakistan too, on 3 November 1947 (Bangash 2010). On 16 November 1947, the Pakistani government sent in a political agent, Sardar Muhammad Alam, establishing direct control over Gilgit. An army officer was also sent in, who organized the local forces – including the Gilgit Scouts and ex-servicemen of the army of Jammu and Kashmir – and set out to invade Jammu and Kashmir from the north, with the support of the Chitral militia sent by its Mehtar. These forces marched into Baltistan, liberating Rondu, Skardu, Ghanche, and Kargil, going as far as Leh (Ahmad 2020). However, they were met by the Indian Army, which pushed them back to a few kilometres before Kargil, where a stalemate ensued, eventually ending in a ceasefire.

The United Nations set up the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), which adopted a three-point resolution, in line with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 39. It called for complete cessation of hostilities; it called for a complete withdrawal of Pakistan's forces, and to hand control over to local authorities, and also called on India to reduce its forces to the bare minimum required for law and order; and finally it called for the two states to consult the Commission to find a way to decide the future of the region. The Karachi Agreement (drafted in August 1948 and signed in July 1949) formally established the ceasefire line between India and Pakistan but failed to lead to the withdrawal of forces or the attempt to decide the future of

the region (India, Pakistan, United Nations 1949).

Within Pakistan, another Karachi Agreement was signed, in April 1949, between Pakistan and the Azad Kashmir government, whereby the Gilgit and Baltistan regions, which were being led by Sardar Muhammad Alam as political agent, were given over to Pakistani administration, ending Azad Kashmiri claims to the region (All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan 1949). In India, the state of Jammu and Kashmir – or what was left of it – entered into negotiations with the Government of India to decide the status of the state. The first legal document drafted was Article 370, which recognized Jammu and Kashmir's special status, and recognized that certain articles of the Indian Constitution would not apply to the state, and allowed the state the autonomy to decide what these articles would be, and that the concurrence of the Constituent Assembly of the State would allow the Central Government to pass any laws related to Jammu and Kashmir. It was accompanied by Article 35A, which allowed the State of Jammu and Kashmir to confer special privileges on its citizens, a continuation of the 'State Subject Rule' – this only allowed residents of Jammu and Kashmir to buy property in the state. This was succeeded by presidential orders, the most important ones being those of 1950, 1952, and 1954. After the Constituent Assembly decided the provisions of the Indian Constitution that would apply to the state, it dissolved itself without recommending the abrogation of Article 370, thus enshrining it as a permanent feature of the Indian Constitution. To an extent, except for foreign affairs, defence, and communication, all laws that pertained to Jammu and Kashmir could be amended by the State Assembly.

Post-Partition

Gilgit-Baltistan: The Evolution of Governance from FCR Rule to Semi-Integration

Under Pakistan, Gilgit-Baltistan went through various iterations. Its first iteration was from 1949-1974. After separating the region from Azad Kashmir, the Gilgit Agency was put under the charge of the political agent in Gilgit, who was answerable to the political resident in Peshawar, who was in charge of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (today part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Under this system, Gilgit Agency was a largely devolved region, with the different states ruling over themselves in a largely autonomous manner. The mirs of Hunza and Nagar in particular exercised much independence. Hence,

most local rajas and mirs practiced virtual autonomy, even though the Pakistani Agent was above them. However, the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) were enforced in the region (Ahmad 2020). It is famously remembered by the phrase, 'na appeal, na wakeel, na daleel' (no right to request a change to any conviction, no right to legal representation, no right to present reasoned evidence) (M. Ali 2011). For all purposes, locals had lost any and all rights they had. It is to be noted that unlike FATA, the Gilgit Agency had no reason to be governed through the FCR, especially since there were no tribal areas in the Agency, with all of them either being directly under the Agent, or part of a certain state (Ahmad 2020). This arrangement continued until 1974, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto decided to remove this particular mode of government in the Gilgit Agency. A number of reforms were brought in. Firstly, the feudal system of princely states and small autonomous jagirs was abolished, thus relieving the locals from multiple forms of taxation and even bonded labour in certain areas. Secondly, after establishing an interim Constitution for Azad Jammu and Kashmir, all Azad Kashmiri claims were completely relinquished, and the Gilgit Agency was renamed as the Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA), and was commonly known as the Northern Areas, a colloquial that remains to this day, despite its renaming in 2009 (Ahmad 2020). The Northern Areas were now led by the Minister of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, and thus the federal government directly controlled the region. It was now divided into three districts: Gilgit, Diamer, and Baltistan. Thirdly, FCR was abolished in the region, and all control was thus passed to the bureaucracy – and the military. In 1978, the Karakoram Highway was also completed, thus connecting the Northern Areas to the rest of the country. However, under Bhutto, Azad Jammu and Kashmir was allowed to establish a government that resembled that of a state, complete with a president, prime minister, legislative assembly, supreme court, high court, and public service commission, while the Northern Areas were not granted any such reforms, with a simple Northern Areas Council being established. While the members of the Council were directly elected, they had virtually no power at all, with all power vested in the KANA Minister (Ahmad 2020).

Under General Zia-ul-Haq, who succeeded Bhutto, the military, which was already powerful in the Northern Areas, became far more entrenched. Under Ayub's martial law, the Gilgit Agency had been excluded from martial law, due to its extraconstitutional status. Now, however, the Northern Areas were included in the martial law zone. After the death of Zia, multiple reforms were brought in by the following governments. Benazir Bhutto introduced the Legal Framework Order of 1994, which changed the Northern Areas Council to the Northern Areas Legislative Council. The council could exercise power over certain local

governance issues but remained largely powerless. This continued on under the rule of Nawaz Sharif and stayed the same when Bhutto came into power again, and then when Sharif came back (Ahmad 2020). Under Musharraf, however, there came a significant change. Musharraf amended the LFO in certain important ways. He firstly changed the name of the Northern Areas Legislative Council to the Northern Areas Legislative Assembly, signifying the fact that the body was no longer purely advisory. It now had the power to pass its own budget. The deputy chief executive of the assembly was made the chief executive, while the chief executive was made chairman of the Northern Areas government. Most importantly, however, the assembly was given the power to amend the LFO. However, despite all these significant reforms, it fell short of giving any true powers to the locals, or any solution to its constitutional limbo (Ahmad 2020). This is in spite of the Supreme Court ordering in 1999, in the Al-Jihad Trust vs Federation case, that despite the Northern Areas not being a constitutional part of Pakistan, the government should, within six months, ensure the constitutional rights of the people, as they fall under the de facto administration of Pakistan (S. Mir 2013).

In 2009, after Musharraf resigned, and the Pakistan People's Party came into power, the government passed a new order, the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order. As suggested by the name of the order, the government renamed the Northern Areas to Gilgit-Baltistan, using regional and ethnic identifiers for the name of the region, rather than a simple directional identification. The name change is highly important because it removes a lot of confusion related to the region. Previously, the Northern Areas were often confused with the neighbouring North-West Frontier Province, and even considered as a part of the province at times. By using the two main regions – Gilgit and Baltistan – a form of self-identity is given to the people, even if the reality is that there are many diverse ethnic groups in the region (Shina, Burusho, Balti, Kho, Wakhi, etc.). Moreover, the reform order, which attempts to create a structure similar to that of an autonomous province of Pakistan, allows for greater democracy in the region, by establishing two new bodies: the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly (GBLA) and the Gilgit-Baltistan Council. The GBLA, which was renamed as the Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly (GLA) in 2018, has directly elected representatives, and separate reserved seats for women, just like the National Assembly of Pakistan, and other provincial legislative assemblies. The Council is a body that comprises of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Governor of Gilgit-Baltistan, six members appointed by the federal government (the Minister of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan (MoKGB) is ex-officio

member), the Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan, and six members appointed by the GBLA. The council legislates on 55 subjects, while the rest are allocated to the GBLA. The package is highly important because it creates a province-like structure for Gilgit-Baltistan, wherein there is a governor appointed by the President of Pakistan, an elected assembly with a range of powers, a high court for the region, and it recognizes such important rights such as freedom of speech, movement, assembly, association, trade, business, and profession amongst others. This is unprecedented, considering the region had seen no major political reforms under either the FCR and feudal rule phase, nor the subsequent direct undemocratic central government control phase. This order creates a framework for a democratic society in Gilgit-Baltistan, but only goes so far, considering the Gilgit-Baltistan Council, which operates under the auspices of the federal government and the MoKGB, controls most of the administrative and financial decisions. The GLA was only given the right to pass a budget, while revenue and expenditures were controlled by the Council (Ahmad 2020).

Jammu and Kashmir: Erosion of Autonomy and Reorganisation Efforts

As stated above, Jammu and Kashmir was recognised as a special state within India, with a certain degree of autonomy, which included state control of internal politics and affairs. This meant that India could not influence internal politics of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1953, Sheikh Abdullah, who had served as Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir from 1948, was arrested for calling for the independence of Jammu and Kashmir (Abdullah and Taing 1985). This resulted him in being arrested. Subsequently, the Plebiscite Front was set up by his allies – such as Mirza Afzal Beg – in 1955, which called for his release and a plebiscite to decide the state's future (Qasim 1992). Abdullah was eventually released, but was then reimprisoned in 1958, when a case was brought to court with evidence that he was collaborating with the Pakistani government to secede from India. The case carried on until 1964, when Jawaharlal Nehru was forced to drop the case due to the protests that ensued in Kashmir after the theft of the relic at Hazratbal Shrine (Abdullah and Taing 1985). In the same year, the State Assembly accepted the provisions of Articles 356 and 357, whereby the Sadr-i-Riyasat became the Governor, and the Prime Minister became the Chief Minister, thus becoming consistent with the rest of India's states (Bose 2003). Next year, the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (JKNC), which was led by Sheikh Abdullah, dissolved itself and became a part of the Indian National Congress (INC), a milestone that marked

the beginning of the end of Jammu and Kashmir's autonomy within India (Bose 2003).

In 1965, the Second Indo-Pakistan War broke out, as a result of the Pakistani-led Operation Gibraltar which infiltrated Indian-held territory. The result was a ceasefire, after which guerrilla groups increased their activities in the region, largely as a result of the official "peace" established between India and Pakistan. Maqbool Bhat and Amanullah Khan formed a new Plebiscite Front at this point, which later became the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and adopted a militant approach to the Kashmir conflict (Schofield 2003). In 1974, Sheikh Abdullah and Indira Gandhi – Prime Minister of India – agreed on an Accord, whereby Jammu and Kashmir would still retain a special status within India, but the Central Government would have more powers to control **laws** in areas that mattered the most, thus restricting the State Assembly to legislate only on the Concurrent List – which contained areas that were shared by both State and Central Governments (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2001). In 1977, Sheikh Abdullah, who had reestablished the JKNC, won the state elections and became the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir.

In 1982, Sheikh Abdullah died, and his son Farooq Abdullah succeeded him as Chief Minister. Under his term, the first major incidents of insurrection came about, when the JKLF murdered the Indian consul in Birmingham, and when Ansarul Islam (precursor to Hizbul Mujahideen) was founded. In this time, Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir (JIJK) and the JKLF came under the wing of the Pakistani military and started to prepare to create an armed insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir (Swami 2007). In 1983, Farooq Abdullah was reelected as Chief Minister, but was soon toppled by a faction of the JKNC led by his brother-in-law, Ghulam Muhammad Shah. Shah had defected to the INC, and with his defectors, established a new government in 1984. This lasted until 1986, when the Anantnag riots took place. The riots were in response to the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, which led to riots in many places in Jammu and Kashmir. Around the same time, Shah had approved the replacement of an ancient Hindu temple by a mosque, claiming that Islam was in danger. These two elements led the local Muslims to erupt in riots, attacking the businesses, homes, and temples of Kashmiri Hindus, leading to the first wave of exodus of Kashmiri Hindus (Tikoo 2012). Subsequent to this, Governor's rule (direct Central rule) was imposed, and Farooq Abdullah was then brought back to power, with the understanding that the INC and JKNC

would contest the next elections together.

In 1987, Farooq Abdullah won the elections again. This time, the Muslim United Front (MUF), a coalition led by the JIJK, claimed that the elections had been rigged (Bose 2003). The MUF gave rise to the Hizbul Mujahideen, which, along with the JKLF, conducted protests across Kashmir, against the alleged rigging conducted by the ruling JKNC, marking the beginning of the Kashmir insurgency. By the second half of 1989, it is alleged that the JKLF assassinated over a hundred officials of the Jammu and Kashmir administration, bringing the government to a halt, which eventually led to the resignation of Farooq Abdullah, and the imposition of Governor's rule in the state (Bose 2003). As a result of the calls for autonomy and/or independence, and targeted killings, between 90,000 and 120,000 Kashmiri Hindus migrated from Kashmir Valley into Jammu, and from there many migrated to regions elsewhere in India (Bose 2021). Since this event, unrest has largely gripped the valley, which continues to this date.

In 2019, the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act was passed by the Parliament of India, after President's rule had been imposed on Jammu and Kashmir, the former chief ministers Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti had been arrested, and total lockdown (including communication) was imposed in the Kashmir Valley by Indian military and paramilitary troops. (The Reorganisation Act, passed by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, led by Narendra Modi, abrogated all the provisions of Article 370 – save the one that states that all provisions of the Constitution of India will be applicable to the state – and also abrogated the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir and Article 35A. Subsequently, it changed the status of Jammu and Kashmir from an autonomous state to a centrally-controlled union territory (Gazette of India 2019). It also separated the former Ladakh Division, making it a union territory in its own right. Both union territories are governed by Lieutenant Governors appointed by the central government, although Jammu and Kashmir has a Legislative Assembly and is allowed a Chief Minister (both institutions are vacant since 2019). However, both can only advise the Lieutenant Governor on certain matters (Gazette of India 2019).

Methods of Incorporation and Consequences

Gilgit-Baltistan: Demographic Manipulation and Sectarian Strife

In Gilgit-Baltistan, we have seen that the modes of governance changed

from a semi-autonomous agency to a strictly federally controlled region, to a provisional province. These changes have largely been the result of the Pakistani state's efforts to incorporate Gilgit-Baltistan within its state structure. This has not been easy however, primarily due to the demographics of Gilgit-Baltistan, which is a Shia-majority region, in an otherwise Sunni-dominated country. The country itself has, since independence, pursued a national identity that is increasingly defined by a certain form of Sunni Islam, which tends to exclude other Islamic interpretations. Thus incorporation also means trying to change the demographic so that the region may fit the national narrative.

The first instance of this method of incorporation is seen in 1974, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto amalgamated the states and districts of the region into the Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA). With this, the State Subject Rule was also abolished, allowing mainland Pakistanis to buy property and settle in the region. Due to the inaccessibility of the Northern Areas, a very slow demographic change began to happen (Feyyaz 2011). It was under Bhutto's successor, Zia, that we see that this increases in magnitudes. Under Zia, three major factors led to what is called sectarianization in Gilgit-Baltistan, whereby the government uses differences between groups – mostly religious – to cause conflict (Wiesner 2020). The three factors here were Zia's Islamization project, which followed a strict Sunni interpretation of sharia law, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the opening of Karakoram Highway. The Islamic Revolution in Iran brought Shia clerics to power, who begun a theocratic rule in Iran, one not unlike that of Zia. These two ideologies conflicted with each other over their interpretation of Islam, and found ground in Gilgit-Baltistan, where the majority was Twelver Shia. Inspired by the Iranian Revolution, they also began to find fault with the demographic change and the Islamization project being pushed by the government and started to create disturbances. The government, which previously had limited access, could now send in people and troops freely into the Northern Areas through the newly opened Karakoram Highway (Feyyaz 2011).

The demographic change was also fueled by the fact that the Northern Areas was a Shia-majority region, an anomaly in Sunni-majority Pakistan. The state, which by Zia's time had openly accepted a Sunni interpretation of Islam, started to view this 'other Muslim' as antithetical to its national narrative, and sought demographic change to fix this. Thereafter, we see that the state embarked on a project to intensify the strife that had started to fester due to Zia's Islamization project, and Khomeini's Shia revolution in Iran. Nosheen Ali suggests that the state started sponsoring both Shia and Sunni organizations

and paid religious leaders from both sects to engage in fatwas against the other sect, and to fuel sectarian protests and strife. By dividing these two sects, the state could justify sending in and setting up security institutions in the Northern Areas (N. Ali 2008).

The Zia government encouraged militant Islamist groups to enter the region and set up bases, largely in the Sunni-majority Diamer division (Astore, Chilas, Darel, Tangir) and thereby brought sectarian strife to the region. This eventually erupted in 1988, in the Gilgit Massacre. In 1988, the Shias of Gilgit city celebrated their Eid a day before the Sunnis. While this was common before 1988, this time it brought the two communities to a heated argument over whose interpretation of the day of Eid was correct. The arguments led to fights and clashes between the two sects. In response to these revolts, the Pakistan Army clandestinely led an operation against the Shias by sending in a group of Sunni tribals (led by Osama bin Laden) from the frontier regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa into Gilgit city, where the tribals ravaged and burnt villages, raping and killing between 300 to 1000 Shias in Gilgit city and nearby villages. Subsequently, a contingent under General Pervez Musharraf was sent in by the Pakistan Army to quell the Sunni invasion, but in fact took part in the raids themselves (Levy and Scott-Clark 2010).

Similarly, another such incident was the 2005 'Textbook Controversy'. In Gilgit-Baltistan, the textbooks used are provided by the Punjab Textbook Board. These textbooks, especially Islamiyat ones, only provide a Sunni interpretation of Islam, and give little room for Shia interpretations. This caused strife in Gilgit-Baltistan, and eventually riots. The Shias were led by Agha Ziauddin Rizvi, who staged protests in the cities of Gilgit and Skardu, such as sit-ins on the Karakoram Highway and student strikes. This led to Sunni counter-protests, and the government refused to change its textbooks. With the assassination of Agha Rizvi, sectarian strife increased manifold, and to prevent clashes, the army started to impose mandatory curfews throughout the region, especially in schools. After this period, the Sunni and Shia camps accepted a compromise, whereby both interpretations would be taught in schools, fatwas against the other sect would be banned, and law and order would be maintained. In the midst of this, the Pakistan Army, as brokers of the agreement and the keepers of the peace through curfews, was able to strengthen its position, and has since justified its intense security apparatus, which controls border checkpoints, has cantonments in the cities, and controls the maintenance and servicing of the roads, through the 'sectarianism' which occurs in Gilgit-Baltistan (N. Ali 2008).

The consequence of this method of incorporation has largely been the rise of a movement that has demanded autonomy or independence from the state. Various local movements have sprung up that try to resist the incorporation that the state forces on them. In Baltistan, which is largely Twelver and Noorbakshi Shia, and has strong cultural and historical links to Ladakh and Tibet, there are locals that have started movements to preserve the local Balti language, script, and culture, in the face of pervasion of Urdu and English in the region (Brandt 2021). In a similar fashion, the Wakhi residents of Gojal have set up institutions to protect their dialect of Wakhi in the face of declining linguistic diversity (Benz 2013). The Balawaristan National Front, led by Nawaz Khan Naji has been calling for separation of Gilgit-Baltistan from the Kashmir dispute, and allowing it self-determination, whether that leads to the region becoming a full constitutional province of Pakistan, or whether it adopts a setup similar to that of Azad Kashmir (Yusufzai 2019).

Jammu and Kashmir: Strategies of Control, Incorporation, and Legitimization

In Jammu and Kashmir, as we have seen above, the state was given a special autonomous status. However, the central government continued to infringe in internal affairs, such as when Sheikh Abdullah was removed from the post of Prime Minister or when Farooq Abdullah was brought to power as Chief Minister through rigged elections. Most importantly, the Reorganisation Act of 2019 led to the central government taking all autonomy away and controlling almost all affairs pertaining to the two union territories.

There have been many other projects led by the central government and the Indian Armed Forces that have been taking place, largely since the start of the insurgency. On the military side, the insurgency first led to the launch of Operation Rakshak, which tried to combat the guerrilla groups that had risen up. This was succeeded by Operation Sarp Vinash, Operation All Out, and Operation Calm Down. All of these operations have largely been aggressive in nature, leading to curfews, break-ins, disappearances, encounters, and severe crackdowns (Kumar 2003) (Press Trust of India 2017).

However, the Indian government has also tried other approaches. The Indian Armed Forces themselves have carried out Operation Sadbhavana, which aims to "win the hearts and minds" of the local Kashmiri population (Cariappa 2008). This is done through infrastructure development, medical

care, women and youth empowerment, and educational development. Another such initiative was Operation Megh Rahat, where the Army came to the rescue of those who had suffered from the intense floods that took place in 2014 in Jammu and Kashmir (ANI 2015). These methods of incorporation have been used to create an environment where the local population trusts the Army to help them, instead of seeing them as a group that aims to suppress their will to self-determination.

A similar method is used by the central government. This method, however, does not try to create an environment that calms the locals, but rather one that calms foreigners. Antia Mato Bouzas, in her book, Kashmir as a Borderland, notices that Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, and the focal point of Kashmir, has been promoted heavily as a tourist destination. However, due to the prevalence of the insurgency, it is easy to understand that Srinagar would be a troubled city. And while it is, it is still open to tourists, largely by cordoning off certain sections, which are more Muslim-populated and are lower-class, and thus more susceptible to being involved in the insurgency. These sections are kept under curfew, while sections such as those around Dal Lake are kept open for tourists and kept safe by army supervision. This allows the government legitimacy over its claim to Kashmir by allowing other Indian citizens and even foreigners to easily access Srinagar, or at least its picturesque sections (Bouzas 2019).

Another method has been demographic change, especially with the Kashmir Valley. The demographic change was not possible in a large manner before 2019, due to Article 35A, which preserved State Subject Rule. However, other Indians were able to set up businesses through joint ventures with Kashmiri locals. After the Reorganisation Act however, Article 35A was abrogated, thus allowing demographic change, which means that the Muslim population in Kashmir can be reduced in proportion by bringing in Hindus from other parts of India. This is especially helpful in the event of a plebiscite happening, as this would guarantee votes in favour of India (Ahmar 2020).

Promotion of Hinduism is also an important tool, by promoting religious pilgrimages to ancient temples located within Jammu and Kashmir. Kashmir has important temples such as Amarnath and the Martand Sun Temple, amongst many others. The central government has promoted religious pilgrimages to Kashmir, and the pilgrimage routes are protected by army personnel. This allows a presentation of normalization in the Valley, and also

presents the Valley as one with a strong Hindu heritage, thus allowing the central government to gradually erase the fact that Muslims are in a majority population in the Valley and legitimize its claim further (Bouzas 2019).

The consequences of the methods of incorporation that the Indian government has used – legal, social, cultural, religious, and military – have largely been discussed above, in the form of the Kashmir Insurgency, which has used peaceful and violent protests, and targeted attacks and assassinations as a form to assert the Kashmiri right to self-determination.

Concluding Notes: Navigating the Complexities of Governance in Kashmir

The strategies employed by Pakistan in Gilgit-Baltistan starkly contrast with those applied in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, where a greater degree of self-autonomy exists. Similarly, in India, the union territory of Ladakh, exhibits a nuanced approach, featuring autonomous district councils centred in Leh and Kargil and has relative independence and lesser suppression despite Ladakh having a Muslim plurality and Kargil having a majority. These differences stem from demographic, historical, and political differences between these four major political divisions of the larger Kashmir region.

The current status of these regions, ranging from the nominal sovereignty of Azad Kashmir to the constitutional limbo of Gilgit-Baltistan, alongside centrally-controlled Jammu and Kashmir and semi-autonomous Ladakh falling in between, has left the notion of self-determination largely unaddressed for over seven decades. Despite evolving governance structures, the quest for self-governance remains elusive for the local populace. Dissatisfaction

over limited political control has fueled protests, unrest, and uprisings across the region. Resolving these challenges necessitates a thorough examination of ground realities and a concerted effort by governing authorities to address grievances and foster genuine self-governance in the region, refraining from prioritizing nationalistic ambitions over the welfare of the local populations.

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Lehenga Uthake Chalo: A Comparative Analysis of Ismat Chughtai's The Homemaker and Saim Sadiq's Joyland

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Abstract

Lehenga Uthake Chalo draws parallels between Ismat Chughtai's short story, *The Homemaker*, and Saim Sadiq's film, *Joyland*, to analyze the bifurcation between deviant and non-deviant expressions of desire through a gendered lens. Drawing from the lead characters and their relationships in the two texts, this paper highlights that normative desire is rooted in respectability and morality which shapes the heteronormative, monogamous institution of marriage. In doing so, this paper argues the institution of marriage attempts to tame desire deeming the expressions of desire existing outside of marriage as deviant. Using Durba Mitra's figure of the prostitute from her text, *Indian Sex Life*: *Sexuality and the Colonial Origins of Modern Social Thought*, this paper emphasizes the construction of the desire divide is based on the otherization of people embodied by Lajjo and Biba in the two texts. Ultimately, this bifurcation fails exposing desire as undomesticated.

Keywords: *deviant desire, normative desire, marriage, respectability, morality, heteronormativity, monogamous, prostitute*

The thing about desire is that it cannot be institutionalized. It is, however, gendered. That is, attempts at institutionalizing desire, such as marriage, have left it operating differently for different genders. Ismat Chughtai's The Homemaker presents a precarious case of the institution of marriage. And it does so because of Lajjo's character. Lajjo, undoubtedly, is a promiscuous woman. It is firmly established in the story that respectability, as perceived in society, is something completely alien to Lajjo. Where respectability plays a crucial role in a person's shaping of their life and identity, Chughtai's Lajjo creates a dissonance in our understanding of respectability as the foundational requirement to be a part of society and by extension Lajjo creates a dissonance in our understanding of desire. This dissonance is created through Lajjo's emotional and physical openness that sets her apart from her male counterparts.

Saim Sadiq's Joyland also presents such a case of the institution of marriage that operates within the patriarchal system of society. Haider's journey from a desire bound in a contract to a desire that knows no bounds, Mumtaz's origins of her promiscuousness, and Biba's desire entangling with Haider's deviant desire highlight new angles for us to understand how the institution of marriage fails miserably to treat desire as something tamable. This essay takes The Homemaker and Joyland to draw parallels between the two to emphasize how desire is bound to cross heteronormative institutions and class divides. Moreover, this essay briefly argues in light of Durba Mitra's Indian Sex Life: Sexuality and the Colonial Origins of Modern Social Thought that the bifurcation between non-deviant desire and deviant desire does not hold since desire operates regardless of one's capacity to tame it.

The female lead in The Homemaker is Lajjo, who works as a maid. The male lead, Mirza, is a bachelor who owns a grocery store. Mirza's friend, Bakshi, suggests that Lajjo become Mirza's maid since he is tired of doing household chores alone. Mirza initially disapproves of this idea because he believes it is improper to live with an unmarried woman, but Lajjo ignores his concerns and begins working for him. Due to Lajjo's background as an illegitimate child who grew up on the streets, she is not viewed as a conventional or 'respectable' woman. It is considered acceptable for Lajjo to have sexual relationships with her male employers. Lajjo's openness and her philosophy about love is clearly shown to us in the text as Chughtai writes, "She had a very large-hearted concept of the man-woman relationship. For

her, love was the most beautiful experience in life" (Chughtai, 2001, p. 80). Her love knows no bounds. In other words, Lajjo's relationship with her desire and sexuality has never been tamed unlike Mirza's who did not grow up in the streets, but rather in a domesticated and structured family space. The dynamics of a family build the fundamental element of respectability in a person's desire that cages their relationship with their sexuality. Mirza is a prime example of such a person who finds the other's desire threatening which, as a result, challenges his repressed relationship with sexuality.

In Joyland, we have a similar portrayal of undomesticated desire which Biba, a transgender dancer, plays in the film. She takes control by taking matters into her own hands. For example, in a scene where she insists the theater manager let her perform in the spotlight, she is not ashamed of using her sexuality for what she wants. Moreover, she is not ashamed of using abusive language and neither is she ashamed of dressing in a way that the heteronormative society deems unfit. Biba's entering the space of the boy's locker room and unapologetically using vulgar and lewd language along with dominant body language to her defense reflects her relationship with respectability which is not dictated by the very heteronormative society that allows men to discuss her body like it is an object (Sadiq, 2022). Biba, in an authoritative tone, says to one of the boys in the locker room, "I say we both take our pants off, so everyone can see what you have got and what I have got" (Sadiq, 2022). On the other hand, Chughtai writes about Lajjo while she is replying to Bakhshi, who would rather take her back than leave her at Mirza's place because he cannot let a whore stay with him under one room, "Lajjo began to hurl such filthy abuses at him that even Bakshi, lecher that he was, broke into a cold sweat" (Chughtai, 2001, p. 78). It is instances like these that reveal to us the ways in which Lajjo and Biba are alike.

While Mirza initially resisted the idea of being intimate with Lajjo, they eventually become sexually involved. In Joyland, too, when Haider and Biba are within the intimate space of Biba's bedroom, we see Haider resisting a kiss that Biba initiated (Sadiq, 2022). This resistance shows the challenge men in The Homemaker and Joyland face on their way to liberating their desires from the shackles of respectability engrained in them via domesticity and the heteronormative family system. Their desires are bound to cross these institutions and class divides that keep them captivated. This struggle is better

captured by Chughtai as she writes about Mirza's restlessness over seeing Lajjo's legs which her lehenga has left exposed while she is asleep. She writes, "The thought of the enticing legs made him restless. A strange fear stifled his throat. He knew that the bitch could kick up a row, but the devil egged him on. From his cot to the kitchen, he had already walked many miles. Now he had no strength to go on. Then a harmless thought entered his mind: If her legs were not bare, he would not feel such thirst for water" (Chughtai, 2001, p. 81). It is imperative to notice that blame comes on Lajjo's legs for enticing Mirza. In Joyland, as Mumtaz makes her way through this challenge using binoculars from the window of her domestic space, the blame, again, comes on Mumtaz more than it does on Haider. Her subversive act of seeking desire where she should not be seeking it was kept a secret by Haider's brother because the family's honor would be damaged (Sadiq, 2022). Here, the dynamics of gendered subversion of desire are shown rather explicitly. While Haider is with Biba in the middle of a street kissing, Mumtaz is within the domestic space masturbating while voyeuristically driving pleasure from a man masturbating in the street (Sadiq, 2022). Since Mumtaz, too, like Haider and Mirza comes from a family, unlike Biba and Lajjo, she finds herself in this challenge like Haider and Mirza yet in the highly gendered unfolding of the events.

In The Homemaker, Lajjo, after Mirza insistently marries her, plays a similar role to that of Mumtaz. It is Chughtai's diligent creativity that allows Lajjo to be comparable to not only Biba but also Mumtaz. After being sexually involved, Mirza is concerned that Lajjo may cheat on him due to her past behavior, so he marries her to secure her loyalty. But marriage is a failed attempt at institutionalizing desire. Mirza becomes unhappy with Lajjo's flirtatious behavior, and he tries to control her by forbidding her from wearing a lehenga and encouraging her to act like a modest Muslim wife. This change of behavior because of marriage is written by Chughtai quite literally as she writes about Mirza catching Lajjo wearing a lehenga despite his disapproval. She writes, "What was her fault? Previously, the same act would have made Mirza swoon over her. Now he got so incensed that he picked up the lehenga and flung it into the fire." (Chughtai, 2001, p 85). Why is Lajjo's lehenga unfit for a modest Muslim wife? Respectability is also dictated by clothing. Since clothes could be used as one's expression of openness toward their desire and sexuality, clothing becomes a tool to tame desire. In Joyland, when Biba's cutout is left exposed in the morning on the rooftop of Haider's house, there is a great threat to the respectability of the domestic space (Sadiq, 2022).

Biba's cutout, much like Lajjo's lehenga, has no room in the domestic space because that space strangles one's openness toward their desire and sexuality. Moreover, Mirza also begins to spend less time at home to avoid being seen as weak. Lajjo, consequently, feels neglected and begins a sexual relationship with a young man named Mithwa. This finds parallels in Joyland where Haider's desire finds expression through his relationship with Biba. Mumtaz, like Lajjo, is also the neglected housewife; however, unlike Lajjo she chooses to satisfy her desire through voyeuristic self-pleasure. In both cases, marriage becomes the very reason that pushes its subjects to disrupt the element of respectability from desire. When Mirza discovers about Lajjo and Mithwa, he beats Lajjo and decides to divorce her. The divorce frees Lajjo from the constraints of marriage and allows her to embrace her sexuality once again. But, in Joyland, the outcomes of a failed heteronormative marriage are portrayed as more devastating resulting in Mumtaz's suicide. In The Homemaker, Chughtai focuses more on the duality of marriage and writes a rather satirical ending. When Mirza later discovers that the marriage and divorce were invalid due to Lajjo's illegitimate birth, he is relieved since his honor and respectability was never lost. Despite his disapproval, Lajjo later returns to work as Mirza's maid and they resume their sexual relationship, bringing the story where it started from. This ending vividly presents the contrast between a free relationship and an institutionalized relationship. A free relationship offers the advantages of companionship and cooperation without any of the drawbacks of a relationship rooted in a normative institution.

Durba Mitra's Indian Sex Life: Sexuality and the Colonial Origins of Modern Social Thought helps to further understand the link between respectability and deviant sexuality. Mitra helps us to see how the ideas of deviant female sexuality in the figure of the prostitute, closest to Lajjo and Biba in this essay, were used to dictate modern social thought in colonial India (Mitra, 2020). Why is Lajjo and Biba's deviant sexuality and free desire an anxiety point for the class of people who rely on the normative institution of hetero-monogamous marriage? One would understand the two as complete opposites. However, Mitra argues it took mutual shaping that resulted not only in the construction of the prostitute but also the shaping of morality and respectability for, first, the colonial masters and then the colony itself (Mitra, 2020). As a consequence, deviant sexuality acts as an anxiety point for people who rely on the construction of morality and respectability. One could think of it as walking away from the extreme of promiscuity to walking toward the

other extreme of hetero-monogamous marriage. Except hetero-monogamous marriage, as argued in this essay, is bound to fail as a normative institution built on the understanding of it as an antidote to desire, promiscuity, and sexuality. In other words, the instance of being respectable and married, which is defined against the Other with deviant sexuality, is not only bound to fail but also inevitably becomes means for the respectable and married to know their sexuality as 'deviant.' Then, the bifurcation between deviant desire/sexuality and non-deviant desire/sexuality is merely a construction because the latter exists only as long as it manages to define itself in the negation of the former. This negation eventually fails because 'deviant' sexuality is, again, a mere construction to define non-deviant sexuality. When the negation of deviant sexuality fails, non-deviant sexuality fails. When non-deviant sexuality fails, what remains is deviant sexuality or rather sexuality/desire as a whole. Ultimately, The Homemaker and Joyland are prime examples of how our moral understanding of marriage is shaped at the cost of Mitra's prostitute. By comparing 'deviant' and 'non-deviant' expressions of desire in The Homemaker and Joyland, this essay highlights how this bifurcation is arbitrary and contingent upon sustaining the hetero-monogamous institution of marriage. Rejecting this divide is essential for cultivating a healthy and long-lasting relationship with desire. The expression of sexuality is not a deviant act, it is part of our practice of love just like it is Lajjo's. To reduce desire to the backwaters of marriage defeats the purpose and practice of love. Perhaps respectability is found not through repression, but through an expression of an authentic and vulnerable commitment to love, whatever form it chooses to take.

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Muhammad Umer Faruque, Sculpting the self: Islam, Selfhood, and Human Flourishing

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Abstract

Despite hundreds of studies, philosophers seem to disagree about whether there is such a thing called the self, or whether the idea of the self might help or constrain out ethical and mental life. Some might even argue that 'self' is a term of abuse posited through the dominance of the enlightenment paradigm and the civilizing mission of the West in order to preach to the colonized that their conceptions of "who they are" must be superseded by modernity and secularization.

- Muhammad Umer Faruque, *Sculpting the self*: *Islam, Selfhood, and Human Flourishing*

In these existing conditions where the philosophy concerning the "self" is in crises Faruque proposes that we have only a couple of possibilities to go about at our disposal. Either we reject that there is any self that exists or salvage the notion of self in such a way that resolves all the contradictions concerning. Now the problem with opting for the first one is as Faruque draws the analogy of throwing a baby out of the bathwater. Since even if we were to hypothesize that the 'self' doesn't exist, the life of almost all of us rests on the conception of self. He even goes as further to state that the conception of self is almost indispensable since it gives most of the people a desire of improvement to achieve self-perfection that lies at their core, they consider the self to be all that gives meaning to their lives. So, as per Faruque a rejection of the self would be devastating as it would lead to a total catastrophe in ethical life. 1 It might even become a gateway for people to nihilism.

Similarly, if one were to impose a theory of the self, they would have to go through the uncountable theories of the self that were proposed in the past to contradict or agree with them. Faruque perfectly explains as to why there are so many disagreements and contradictions among scholars about conception of self. He argues that often scholars tend to focus on a particular dimension of self and fail to realize the multidimensionality of the self. 2 He uses the Rumi's parable of the elephant and the blind men to explain the multidimensionality of the self. Each blind man feels a different part of the elephant's body and after it they describe the elephant thus having endless contradictions. 3 So, to reach a conclusion one must be able to acknowledge the sheer multidimensionality of the Self. In this paper I aim to compare and analyze two primary texts; Sculpting the Self: Islam, Selfhood, and Human Flourishing by Muhammad Umer Faruque that focuses on Islamic hermeneutics of the self and James Duerlinger's paper on Vasubandhu's "Refutation of the Theory of a Self" that primarily focuses on the Buddhist hermeneutics of the self as explained by Vasubandhu.

Before plunging into the Buddhist conception of the self lets point out the four noble truths of Buddhism since these truths are said to be the first teachings of Buddha. The Buddha stated these four noble truths when he was sitting under a tree and giving a sermon. If we were to further analyze them and take it away from its literal translation it would be 1) Life is fundamentally suffering. 2) Attachment/Desire is the basis of all suffering. 3) One can liberate oneself from suffering. 4) The path through which suffering ends (Nirvaan).

According to the Indian Buddhist when we think of a self or selfhood perhaps from a first-person singular viewpoint, we are essentially basing it on our bodies and minds thus we create a false appearance of a self and the acceptance of it becomes the root of all suffering. So, the fundamental question that Vasubandhu presents is whether the self-exist or doesn't? The same question that Faruque asked. However, as Faruque resorted to discuss the multiple conceptions of the self in Islam, Vasubandhu believes that our false selves are a person that can be identified independently of our bodies and minds. Vasubandhu raises an issue of the ultimate existence. If we do not exist as entities that can be independently identified, then in what form do we exist in ultimate reality. "At this place, it is necessary to differentiate between and explain about conventional and ultimate reality in Buddhism as it is well connected to the concept of self. 5

Buddha explains the truth or reality in two levels, sa□v□ti-satya and paramārtha-satya. Sa□v□ti- satya refers to the conventional reality, the truth based on the perception of common people. It refers to the empirical reality that all of us experience. It is distinct from the paramārtha-satya which lies beneath the empirical reality and refers to the ultimate reality. It has to do with the ultimate emptiness of the universe that is regarded as the true nature of the phenomenal world.

Vasubandhu explains the conceived reality as "the existence of bodies and minds in dependence upon which we are conceived" (James Duerlinger, 2) then he futher goes on to explain the ultimate reality as "the existence we posess apart from being conceived." (James Duerlinger, 2) So another issue that arises because of these two forms of truths and realities is that whether we exist ultimately or not. Chandrakirti - a Buddhist scholar that believes that nothing exists ultimately and there is no conception of self. But then what about the self-referring expression of "I"? He believes that first-person singular reference does not refer or depend upon a reference that ultimately exists, but he doesn't negate that "I" is a referring expression rather it refers to a mentally constructed "I" and nothing else. However, Vasubandhu and Pudgalavådins seem to disagree with Chandrakirti as they believe first-person singular references are possible since it is also a reference to something that ultimately exists. Multiple views come into play when we discuss the different conceptions of existence. 'One view is that to exist is to be a substance or an attribute of a substance, and another is that it is to be either a substance or a collection of substances conceived for practical purposes as a distinct entity of some sort. A third view is that it is to exist apart

from being conceived, and a fourth is that it is to exist in dependence upon being conceived.' (James Duerlinger, 2)

Strawson argues that if one wants to understand the being of self one should look at the experience from an individual 'I' that is the first-person perspective. Since only self-experience provides us with a vivid sense that there is something that is self. He further argues that if something like self truly does exist then it must have properties which feature in any genuine form of self-experience. Now according to Faruque these arguments pose serious threats to the third person perspective. The empirical approaches of the self are very prevalent in neuroscience. Faruque uses a little experiment to explain why such approaches are problematic. He instructs us to lift our right hand and pinch our left forehand. Now from a third person perspective a neuroscientist would tell you that we can analyze a given mental state and observe the effects on other parts of the brain, for example in this case a neuron firing and its effects on the other parts of the brain. Secondly, right after a few milliseconds of you pinching your hand, you feel pain.
Just an unpleasant feeling. But still this slight unpleasantness can only be felt by you. It's only accessible to you and only you can describe it. By using this experiment Faruque draws conclusion that mental experience can be analyzed in both first-person and third-person perspective.

Yet the scientific observation takes into account all the physical description, but it still can't consider the questions that account for the subjective feel of any mental states that can only be experienced by from the first-person perspective which we call 'I'. So, we see that even no matter how complex a physical system is I.e a brain it is still a physical system that can be analyzed and studied, it cannot supersede the first-person stance of subjectivity that restricts the I to its individual.

The aforementioned couple of paragraphs allows to acknowledge the limits of scientific or objectivist approach to the self. Faruque divides the self in two to better explain it. He divides the self into descriptive and normative levels. He categorizes the bio-physiological, socio-cultural, and cognito-experiential aspects of the self in descriptive self. Further he categorized the ethical and spiritual aspects of the self into normative level. Now before moving onto normative level the bio-physiological self refers to the entire body as well as the brain, and all the major organ systems in the body. Next, the socio-cultural self refers to

what it means to be human in a particular socio-cultural space. This is shaped by features such as ethnicity, gender, race, language, religion, nationality, and sexual orientation. This is why often the modern socio- anthropological research believes self-hood to be a very fluid concept subject to continuous change. But analysis of bio-physiological and socio-cultural self makes us realize that self is much more and in particular it's cognito-experiential aspect of the self. 10 Faruque describes the cognito-experiential as "The first-personal subjective stance, which is the ground of cognition and cognitive functions." (Muhammad U Faruque, 40)

From the above analyses we can conclude that self is not objective that cannot change instead its essential nature is always changing. According to Faruque the normativity of the self means it is both received and achieved. The self can be described in all its physicalities from atomic and molecular to the psycho-social details but even then, one cannot actualize the self. One's ability to form a subjective first-person stance enables us to differentiate between right and wrong and enables us to have morals, thoughts, intentions and judgements. It helps us initiate a process of incorporating ethico-spiritual values. The sheer multidimensionality of the self implies that there will always be some ambiguities that will remain unresolved.

Ṣadr ad-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī was a 17th century Islamic Philosopher admits says "The human self (al-nafs al-insaniyya) does not have a known level when it comes to its identity, nor does it have a determined level in existence like other natural, psychic and intellectual existents, for each of these has a known station. Rather, the human self has different levels and dimensions (maqamat wa-darajat), and it has both antecedent and subsequent modes of being (wa-laha nasha at sabuqa wa-lahiqa), and in each station and would it take a different form.

The above passage shows how Mulla Sadra tackles the problem of selfhood. He accepts the definition of self as the "first perfection of an organic natural body that has life potentially," he criticizes the philosophers for failing to understand the intricacy that revolves around the self. To understand that self has a nature beyond its functionalities.

"My heart has become capable of every form:
It is a pasture for gazelles and a convent for Christian Monks."

This poem of Ibn Arabi is cited by Mulla Sadra within his quote sets the tone for his perspective of selfhood and subjectivity. In the poem he reinforces that self can embrace multiple and many forms such as a Muslim, Christian, a Jew or even an idol worshipper.

The Buddhist conception of self is of course extremely distinct from the Islamic selfhood. Faruque explained the Islamic though of self as consisting of two levels meanwhile in Buddhism there is no conception of self. Since there is no self, the selfhood is an aggregate, that is referred to as skandha-s in Buddhism. This conception is accepted in all schools of Budhhism.The five aggregates are as follows: bodily forms (rupa), feelings (vedana), discrimination (samjna), volitional forces (samskara), and consciousness (vijnana).

These aggregates are impermanent in nature and form a casual continuum due to which they can be conceived as the same person. Pudgalavådins are of the view that people are conceived only by the aggregates they have acquired that belong to them and exist in the present for a time being. The continuum of these aggregates is the basis upon which a person is conceived and as person achieves nirvana aggregates cease to exist. 17 According to Vasubandhu if the person is conceived in their aggregates, it is same as conceiving milk on the basis of the elements it contains. However, Pudgalavadins think people are not conceived like this analogy but rather they use different example to demonstrate how persons are conceived, they believe that persons are conceived as the fire is conceived in reliance upon the fuel. Similarly, persons are conceived in reliance upon their aggregates i.e skandha's. 18

Candrakirti believes after doing several analyses that conventionally real people do not have any conception of ultimate existence. Since persons are neither other nor the same in existence as their collection of acquired aggregates upon which they are conceived by themselves and the others. This is the same argument that Pudgalavadins use to deny that persons are either substantial realities or substantially established realities. However, Pudgalavadins believe that person who are neither other nor the same as collection of their aggregates, can exist ultimately unlike Chandrakirti stated. They believe that a person exists ultimately since their aggregates causes ultimate perception of themselves and the causes of such effects always ultimately exist. But since Vasubandhu only recognizes two forms of existence that are substantial reality or substantially established reality

he also believes that persons do not ultimately exist if they are neither the other nor the same as their collection of aggregates. 19

So far, my aim has been to compare the two texts pertaining to Buddhist and Islamic hermeneutics of the self in the two school of thoughts. So, summing up the arguments I presented above according to what Muhammad U. Faruque writes from the perspective of Islamic School of thought is that the self is rather divided between the two levels, the normative and the descriptive level that we discussed above. But throughout the book he strongly emphasized that we should consider the self as a spectrum and a multidimensional model rather than a non-binary or a binary. He even uses texts and evidence from Mulla Sadrah, and Ibn e Arabi to support his argument and he also explains that the multidimensionality of the self is the main reason philosophers and academics fails to grasp at the idea of the self and as to why there are so many contradictions concerning the self and the selfhood.

However, like I stated above the Buddhist school of thought negates any conception of self. Like we discussed above the self is conceived by reliance upon the aggregates and there a lot of contradictions in Buddhism itself as to whether the aggregates cause person or enable them to exist ultimately or not. However, it is widely accepted that attaching oneself to these skandha's or aggregates is the root of all suffering, and these aggregates ceases to exist when the person achieves Nirvaan.

Even though Faruque gives the reason that it's paramount to talk about the self since there is a crisis of the theories of self and selfhood and it has almost reached its dead end however he gives a very academic reason to study the self. The reason why it is extremely necessary to reorient ourselves towards flourishing of the self and spirituality is that we are living in a post-modern era and a dystopian society that doesn't allow any space for self-improvement in the spiritual realm. The future the world is heading towards is not very pleasant and it's a direct consequence of our misplaced priorities which is why we need a mass reorientation.

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